Fundamental human rights and cosmopolitan justice by Kilravey, Lucas
i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fundamental Human Rights and Cosmopolitan Justice 
 
by 
© Lucas Kilravey 
A Thesis submitted to the 
School of Graduate Studies 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
Master of Arts 
Department of Political Science 
Memorial University of Newfoundland 
 
May 2014 
St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
One of the most contentious debates within political theory today surrounds the 
universality of Human Rights. To explore this debate, we first carefully define the 
amorphous terminology employed in such discussions and advance a theoretically 
grounded framework for fundamental Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice. With this 
in mind we trace the evolution of the concepts of cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights 
to the present debates. Engaging with criticisms of cultural and Western imperialism in 
turn, we advance a case with counterbalancing examples to provide evidence for the 
cosmopolitan nature and applicability of fundamental Human Rights. This paper adds to 
ongoing theoretical and practical debate by disentangling questions of fundamental 
Human Rights from questions of praxis derived from contingent socialization, 
essentialized identity and ideal Human Rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to extend my sincere thanks to my advisor, Dr. Lucian Ashworth, for his 
unfailing positivity and helpfulness. The feedback, advice and expertise offered by Dr. 
Ashworth were invaluable. 
Additionally I would like to thank Dr. Miriam Anderson for her assistance in helping me 
navigate the M.A. thesis process more generally. Her kindness and experience were a 
determining factor in the success of this endeavour. 
I would also like to express my gratitude for the financial support offered for my M.A. 
studies by the Memorial University of Newfoundland and the Department of Political 
Science. 
Last, but certainly not least, I would like to extend my thanks to Ms. Amy King for her 
ceaseless assistance. Ms. King’s philosophical and editorial input, in addition to her 
constant moral and intellectual support, were more than anyone could reasonably have 
asked for. Thank you. 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………….. ii 
Acknowledgement………………………………………………………………………. iii 
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………... iv 
Part I – Introduction……………………………………………………………………… 1 
Part II – Literature Review……………………………………………………………... 21 
Part III – A Brief History of the Idea of Human Rights and Cosmopolitan Justice…..... 32 
Part IV – Addressing Criticisms of Human Rights as Cosmopolitan Justice…………... 50 
Part V – Human Rights as Cosmopolitan Justice in Perspective……………………… 73 
Part VI – Conclusion………………………………………………………..………….. 87 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………. 95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Part I – Introduction 
Human Rights are a subject of great contemporary interest and debate in political, 
academic and quotidian spheres. Despite this lively and diverse exchange regarding 
Human Rights, from a Western perspective they can seem such an inherent and fixed part 
of our political structure, morality and discourse as to encourage and allow us to forgot 
what a largely recent and radical idea they represent – and, arguably, these are points 
worth considering. 
 
Human Rights have undergone a remarkable and rapid transformation from utopian ideal 
to status quo. The first major modern promulgations relating to Human Rights emerged 
from the revolutionary fervour of the American  Revolution in the Declaration of 
Independence in 1776 and the French Revolution in the forms of the Declarations of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 and 1793. In the 20
th
 century, arguably the most 
famous and referenced Human Rights manifesto, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was adopted by the newly formed United Nations on December 10
th
, 1948. In the 
space of less than 200 years, Human Rights went from a revolutionary challenge to the 
prevailing order to the collectively agreed –if not applied – standard of governance 
around the world.  
 
Perhaps even more striking than the relative recentness of Human Rights is the radical 
concept of cosmopolitan justice which underwrites them. Cosmopolitan justice is an 
interpretation of justice which holds that there is a universal justice, valid in all cultures. 
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The simplicity of this phrase can prove deceptive; what flows from such a conception of 
cosmopolitan justice is that all people have certain rights and that to deny them such 
rights is both unnatural and unjust. Cosmopolitan justice thus understood is arguably the 
most fundamental and primordial form of justice. This is important in that, if we consider 
justice to be the ultimate evaluative standard against which actions are measured, it 
follows that cosmopolitan justice constitutes the evaluative standard against which all 
actions, and all legal and societal conceptions of justice, can be measured. Such a 
conception of justice radically empowers individuals and shears through the cultural, 
social and political contexts of their lives, implying a direct and fundamental statement of 
priority for innately sourced Human Rights over the prescriptions of religion and the 
state.  
 
Understandably, such a radical conception of justice, claiming universal and inalienable 
applicability has not failed to attract a broad range of criticism and misuse. Cosmopolitan 
justice and Human Rights have often been used as an aegis for imperialism and Western 
chauvinism – inasmuch, they are concepts often associated with both Western and 
cultural imperialism. In this light, considerable dissonance exists between those who 
perceive Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice to be universal and just and those who 
perceive them as, to one degree or another, part of a imperialist or chauvinist structure. 
 
Inasmuch, we will more specifically explore what evidence exists to support the claim 
that fundamental, universal Human Rights are a manifestation of the universality of 
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cosmopolitan justice and  not just the product of cultural or Western imperialism. Given 
the contentiousness and complexity of the subjects being broached, this work can neither 
claim to be definitive nor exhaustive but will do its utmost to be comprehensive. 
Approaching the subject from the position of a thought experiment, we can examine this 
question with the hope of contributing to the broader debate surrounding both Human 
Rights and cosmopolitan justice and the relationship between them. Using the approach 
of a thought experiment, we are able to explore ways that the argument for Human Rights 
as cosmopolitan justice could be made and contribute to the wider debate – it must be 
clearly stated that we are not claiming that anything advanced herein is irrefutable or 
final.   
 
Given the scale and sophistication of the subject matter at hand, it is best that we first lay 
out a very clear course by which to address the complex and subtle arguments 
surrounding Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice in both theoretical and practical 
application. First, as a preliminary, we will clarify the terminology we will be using and 
discuss both why this question is worth asking and why a political theory approach is an 
appropriate method by which to explore it. Secondly, this work will outline how 
fundamental Human Rights are a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice. We will then 
provide a brief historical overview of the history of Human Rights and cosmopolitan 
justice and upon their inter-relation and evolution. Third, having established what 
cosmopolitan justice is we will address the main accusations of imperialism advanced 
against cosmopolitan justice and the idea of human rights as a manifestation of 
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cosmopolitan justice (i.e., cosmopolitan justice is a form of Western and/or cultural 
imperialism). Fourth, we will examine a case in which we can see the tension between 
cosmopolitan and local forms of justice. Lastly, we will summarize our argument and 
draw our final conclusions.  
Defining Terms 
In order to ensure we do not get tangled in the complexity and conflicting meanings of 
the contentious terms we will be dealing with, it is important first that we provide precise 
definitions for the concepts under scrutiny. Terms and ideas like human rights and empire 
are particularly tricky; the debates surrounding and employing them and the historical 
contexts within which they exist are so diverse that the terms have developed a vast 
panoply of different and valid meanings and become something of a language onto 
themselves. Inasmuch, it is important to be very clear about what this paper means when 
using these terms so that are arguments are mutually comprehensible.  
Empire & Imperialism 
First then, let us begin with arguably the most contentious of terms at use, that of empire 
and/or imperialism. For the purposes of this work, the term imperialism is understood, in 
its most basic and generic form, to mean “an unequal human and territorial relationship, 
usually in the form of an empire, based on ideas of superiority and practices of 
dominance, and involving the extension of authority and control of one state or people 
over another.” (Gregory et al., p.373). We adopt this definition both for its concision and 
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because it best captures the hierarchical nature of imperialism implicit in the discussion 
of Western and cultural imperialisms which we shall undertake. 
While this work uses what could be deemed a conventional understanding of 
imperialism, it is important to note that, according to many prominent definitions of 
empire and imperialism, a universal concept like cosmopolitan justice is inescapably 
imperialist. Marxist turned neo-conservative scholar Lewis Samuel Feuer advanced a 
well known binary definition of imperialism. Feuer argued that imperialism itself is a 
natural political phenomena, but that it can be divided into regressive imperialism, 
defined by brute force conquest and expansion (i.e., the Spanish Empire) and progressive 
imperialism, which is predicated on a cosmopolitan view of humanity (i.e., humanity is 
one contiguous moral community and universal morality is possible) and an attempt by 
the central metropole to spread its superior civilization to, in its view, backwards people 
(for this form of imperialism, he gives the Roman Empire as a example) (Feuer, 1989, 
p.4).  Working with this definition, cases could be made by those in favour of Human 
Rights as cosmopolitan justice that this is a form of progressive imperialism (and, vice 
versa, it could be labeled regressive imperialism by those opposed). No matter the 
normative interpretation, Human Rights claiming cosmopolitan justice would be an 
example of imperialism. 
Similarly, Neo-marxist scholars Negri and Hardt, in perhaps the most important recent 
work on the subject, Empire, also advance a dichotomous definition of 
empire/imperialism of their own. Imperialism is understood to be essentially akin to the 
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regressive imperialism advanced by Feuer, specifically referring in the case of Negri and 
Hardt to the literal imperialist policies of European nation-states. Empire, they argue, is, 
on the other hand, any system which claims universal applicability and accepts no 
boundaries. From this point of view, the argument that Human Rights are a manifestation 
of cosmopolitan justice is an example of an imperial system in that it holds universal 
applicability predicated on one’s very humanity (Hardt & Negri, 2001, p.11).  
In a similar vein, Hannah Arendt (in her indispensable work, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism) made the argument that any system which claimed universal 
applicability was totalitarian  (Arendt, 1986). Additionally, in the most literal dictionary 
defined sense, totalitarianism can be understood as “exercising control over the freedom, 
will or thought of others” (Random House, 2013) and both cosmopolitan justice and 
Human Rights can be understood to limit the absolute freedom and will of others (i.e., in 
preventing them from discriminating against others and acting on this desire). Inasmuch, 
one can argue that according to both Arendt’s and a dictionary definition of 
totalitarianism , Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice could be understood to be, to 
some degree, totalitarian.   
Returning to the definition of imperialism itself, we can also look to the widely 
referenced binary definition of imperialism advanced by Raymond Aron, a 20
th
 century 
French thinker and politician. Mr. Aron distinguished between imperialism (i.e., 
domination by force, central metropole, etc.,) and imperial (a pre-eminent metropole 
administering a mutually beneficial order with other states, peoples, etc.,) (Aron, 1974, 
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p.256-258). Aron articulated his definitions in a discussion of American power, 
discussing how the United States behaved in an imperial way with Europe and other close 
allies (i.e., a largely symbiotic relationship in which American power and primacy 
benefited all those in the system) as opposed to its imperialist (which is to say 
exploitative and pernicious) behavior with other countries (Aron, 1974, p.256-258). This 
differentiation – between a mutually beneficial order and a pernicious and dominating 
closely resembles the binary definition of Feuer. 
In short, we could explore the conflicting meanings of empire and imperialism (and 
related terms like totalitarianism) indeterminately but, for the sake of this work, let this 
brief synopsis remind us both of the simple definition we are using for 
empire/imperialism and of the fact that according to many prominent understandings of 
imperialism, any system claiming universal application would be considered imperial (or 
even possibly totalitarian). With these definition in mind, we can see that for some – 
indeed for many – Human Rights and cosmopolitanism are intimately tied up with 
imperialism and empire, be it of a normatively desirable variant or not.  
Human Rights 
 Let us next to our attention to defining a no less contentious term: Human Rights. To 
begin, it is worth noting that there are few terms with a more flattering or positive 
association than Human Rights. Arguably, it is precisely because of this powerfully 
positive connotation that Human Rights have become difficult to define. As various 
groups have tried to frame their demands within the normatively and politically 
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persuasive language of Human Rights, we have witnessed something of a dilution of 
what constitutes a Human Rights (Cranston 1973, p.65-71; Nickel, 2013). 
To make the definitions as clear and concise as possible, it is necessary to boil Human 
Rights down to its core, defining elements. Moreover, for the purposes of our work it is 
not necessary to distinguish between legal, social, individual, group, etc., forms of 
Human Rights. 
Rather, we adopt the idea that Human Rights are held solely in the virtue of being a 
human being (not by divine providence) and are not contingent upon belonging to any 
particular society at any time. This being said, we acknowledge, as Burke noted in his 
comments on the Declarations of the Rights of Man which we shall see subsequently, that 
such rights are only meaningfully employed, enjoyed and protected within specific social 
and legal frameworks (Burke, 2006, p.144). Working from this premise, we will also 
adopt the idea of Cranston (1973, p.65-71) that Human Rights is a term we should 
reserve only for the most important protections and freedoms. Cranston influentially, if 
not uncontroversially, argued that fundamental human rights are the successors of what 
he labels the historic natural rights to life, liberty and property(1973, p.65-71). He argued 
that a violation of these fundamental rights represented an egregious violation of justice.  
Inasmuch we will be using a modest understanding of Human Rights (life, liberty, etc.,) 
concerning the “lower limits on tolerable human conduct” (Shue, 1996, p.18). We can 
arguably label these rights (life, liberty, freedom from cruel and unjust treatment, etc.,) 
fundamental vs. ideal Human Rights, being concerned with preventing the worst rather 
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than securing the best. As a test of which rights fit into this fundamental and minimal 
category we can ask: does the violation of this right present a grave affront to justice as 
advanced by Cranston? (Cranston, 1973, p.65-71) Inasmuch we can say that protection 
from torture, the equality of all persons before the law, freedom from religious 
persecution, etc., satisfy this criteria while rights such as the right to form unions, or the 
right to free post-secondary education – while still important – do not satisfy this 
requirement. 
Therefore, the definition of Human Rights for our purposes are those fundamental rights 
held everywhere, by everyone (regardless of whether or not their environment recognizes 
them) by virtue of their humanity alone, which serve to protect them from grave affronts 
to justice. Inasmuch we are not advancing a set list of Human Rights which qualify as 
fundamental; rather, we are suggesting the idea of fundamental Human Rights as being 
those which protect against egregious violations of justice as a framework within which 
to consider the claim of a right to be a fundamental Human Right. We are not claiming 
that other rights are not legitimate Human Rights in their own virtue, but to reiterate 
again we are focused here on the most intuitively universal protections (life, liberty, 
freedom from cruel and unjust treatment) in the most literal sense.   
It is important to again clarify that we are focusing on Arendt’s concept of the right to 
have rights (i.e., on the absolute claim to fundamental rights by human beings regardless 
of context) (Arendt, 1986,  p.436).. We are not exploring whether or not every Human 
Right heretofore enumerated in various conventions represents a manifestation of 
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cosmopolitan justice as this is quite beyond the remit of this paper. Such a discussion 
would belong in the realm of international relations and would be a matter of discussing 
how competing interests manifested themselves structurally across more than a century of 
political and social debates. Moreover we are not addressing the various claims of 
competing forms of modern codified Human Rights (cultural, economic, social rights, 
etc.,) against one another. 
 
We are rather concerned with the primordial underpinnings of fundamental Human 
Rights – as Arendt put it, that fundamentally human beings have a right to rights and that 
this is a manifestation of and is legitimated by cosmopolitan justice. In the history of 
Human Rights we shall subsequently trace, we mention the legal conventions and the rise 
of the international Human Rights regime only insomuch as it helps us to understand the 
development of the idea that Human Rights are a part of cosmopolitan justice with 
universal validity. These points being made, let us now turn to the definition of 
cosmopolitan justice. 
Defining Cosmopolitan Justice 
Justice can be described as both a virtue and the ultimate evaluative standard for any 
other action. To define cosmopolitan justice, therefore, we must be careful to establish 
how we posit the existence of an evaluative and morally binding standard with global 
applicability. To do so, we will advance a syncretic definition drawn principally from 
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Kant, Arendt and Rawls but informed by other ideas and thinkers (most notably Pogge 
and Nussbaum).  
 
Rawls and The Original Position 
 
Let us begin by saying that we accept the basic validity of the Rawlsian conception of 
justice [i.e., “justice as fairness” (Rawls, 1999)]. Moreover, we agree with the logic of the 
Rawlsian original position, in that in his proposed thought experiment of the original 
position, persons would agree to the two principles of justice he advances.  
 
For the purposes of this work, it is the first of these conceptions which matter to us, 
namely that all rational people would agree to a set of equal rights and liberties required 
to underwrite the fundamental interests of free and equal citizens. This principle of 
justice, applicable to everyone, everywhere at all times and arguably intuitively, 
rationally knowable is the basic principle of a cosmopolitan conception of justice and, in 
the framework we advance, Human Rights represent the manifestation of this concept 
through the set of equal rights and liberties required to underwrite the fundamental 
interests of all peoples. We are aware that Rawls does not agree with the applicability of 
his conception of justice internationally (Rawls, 1993) - on this point, we respectfully 
disagree with Rawls. This disagreement is no mere matter of caprice – notable 
contemporary scholars of Human Rights Beitz (1979  & 2009)and Pogge (1988, 1992 & 
2008) specifically reject the idea that the Rawlsian original position is only applicable 
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within a given nation state and posit their ideas of cosmopolitan justice on a global 
application of the two principles of justice. 
 
Pogge and Kant 
 
Thomas Pogge has advanced a popular definition of cosmopolitan justice (based 
ultimately on shared and inherent claims to Human Rights). His understanding of 
cosmopolitan justice is tripartite in that it is predicated on individualism, generality and 
universal applicability.  (Pogge, 1992, p.48-75)  
 
The normative authority and framework for Pogge’s understanding of cosmopolitan 
justice as Human Rights flows from Kantian argumentation. This fits perfectly with 
Pogge’s endorsement of the Rawlsian original position as Rawls himself wrote: “[The 
Original Position] may be viewed … as a procedural interpretation of Kant’s conception 
of autonomy and the categorical imperative within the framework of an empirical 
theory.” (Rawls, 1999, p.226). Inasmuch, the Kantian normative assumptions at work 
here are that a) every individual is an end in itself, b) all persons are entitled to rights 
irrespective of the contingent circumstances of their birth and c) all persons are morally 
obliged to respect these rights (Kleingeld, p.76-84) 
 
To see Kant feature so prominently in such an account of cosmopolitan justice may be 
surprising to those accustomed to the customary minimalist interpretations of Kant's 
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work. However, many scholars (like Rawls as mentioned above) have read Kant with a 
more radical and maximalist interpretation. After all, it was Kant’s Perpetual Peace 
(which we shall explore further along in this work) which was the first work to call for a 
cosmopolitan order based upon Human Rights which Kant argued were both innate and 
necessary to advance within the legal framework of any legitimate republic (Hoffe, 
2006). 
 
Indeed, in Kant’s Metaphysis of Morals, he argues that the fundamental human right 
endowed to everyone by virtue of their humanity alone is: “freedom (independence from 
the coercive choice of another), in so far as it can coexist with the freedom of every other 
in accordance with a universal law” (Kant, 1996, 6: 237). This inherent Human Rights to 
freedom includes “innate equality, that is the independence from being bound by others 
to more than one can in turn bind them” (Kant, 1996, 6: 237). As maximalist 
interpretations (such as that advanced by contemporary Kantian scholar Hoffe) would 
have it, since every person possesses an inviolate freedom, it follows that: "every subject 
with legal ability must be granted a second-order right, the right to be reckoned with in 
this legal capacity" (Hoffe, 2006, p.121). Put differently, all persons possess the right to 
have rights –or inversely – all legal orders are required to recognize this inherent freedom 
(and the rights that necessarily flow from it) to be considered just (Bohman 2007).  
 
Arendt and the Right to Rights 
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It is with the introduction of the inalienable and fundamental right to have rights to which 
we alluded in the previous section that we draw the thought of Hannah Arendt into our 
definition of cosmopolitan justice. In her work, The Origins of Totalitarianism (of which 
we will see more subsequently), Arendt comes to same conclusion as Kant in his 
Metaphysics of Morals, namely that all persons have a fundamental right to rights. 
Writing when she did, after the horrors of the Second World War, Arendt offered 
powerful normative endorsement to this right to rights, arguing that the only true crime 
against humanity is the denial of the theoretical and practical right to rights (Arendt, 
1986,  p.436).  
 
This right to right – posited by both Kant and Arendt – arguably gives rise to a correlative 
basic duty of self-respect or, in the words of Kant, “to demand  respect" and not to allow 
oneself to be debased or treated as a mere means, in keeping with the categorical 
imperative (Bohman, 2007). 
 
Taqlîd 
It is useful at this point to introduce an idea from the apogee of classical Arab thought 
which allows us to clearly distinguish between the normative exigencies of cosmopolitan 
morality and Human Rights and the cultural praxis of a given community. This new, or 
rather very old, term is taqlîd which can be defined as: “the beliefs and values stemming 
from the contingent circumstances of our socialization rather than from rational 
deliberation.” (Fraenkel, 2012) The plural world of classical Islam provides an example 
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of great pertinence to our present debates surrounding ideas of cosmopolitan justice and 
Human Rights as testified by this anecdote from historian al-Hymaydi: 
“At the [...] meeting there were present not only people of various [Islamic] sects but 
also unbelievers, Magians, materialists, atheists, Jews and Christians, in short 
unbelievers of all kinds. Each group had its own leader, whose task it was to defend its 
views [...]. One of the unbelievers rose and said to the assembly: we are meeting here for 
a debate; its conditions are known to all. You, Muslims, are not allowed to argue from 
your books and prophetic traditions since we deny both. Everybody, therefore, has to 
limit himself to rational arguments [hujaj al-‘aql]. The whole assembly applauded these 
words.” (Fraenkel, 2012) 
 
The spirit of, and the ideas underwriting, this medieval debate are ones which we can 
usefully employ to more constructively test our understanding of what constitutes a 
question of cosmopolitan justice and what constitutes a question of taqlîd.  
 
Taqlîd ties in with the arguments we have already seen from Rawls and Kant. For his 
part, Rawls’ use of the veil of ignorance is meant to capture an important facet of 
freedom necessary to justice, namely our freedom to endorse ideas and normative 
arguments not determined by the random circumstances/contingencies of our lives 
(Rawls, 1999, p.225). The veil of ignorance does so by encouraging us to consider the 
justice of the distribution of goods of a society, not knowing where we would find 
ourselves in its hierarchy. Kantian assumptions of cosmopolitan rights maintain that all 
persons are entitled to rights irrespective of the contingent circumstances of their birth. 
Taqlîd is a term we introduce not out of mere exoticism, but rather as testament and 
reminder that the aim of attempting to think beyond the contingencies of one’s birth is 
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not an ideal unique to the West or to the Enlightenment and thus has a greater claim to 
cosmopolitan credentials. 
 
Inasmuch, it is a legitimate expression of cosmopolitan justice to take exception to the 
unjust treatment of women in many traditional (and indeed, modern) societies today. Let 
us be clear that this form of discrimination cannot be justified on the contingent taqlîd of 
a culture alone but represents an egregious violation of justice and of their inherent right 
to rights and is therefore a question of Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice. Human 
Rights and moral cosmopolitanism have very little to say about the taqlîd related 
practices of a given culture except where traditional practices violate their precepts. In 
this light, we can conceive of Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice as creating a 
sandbox of sorts within which each culture can order itself however it likes, as long as it 
respects the inalienable and fundamental rights which the inhabitants of all cultural or 
political orders enjoy in virtue of their pre-political humanity (Nussbaum, 2011, p.30-35).  
 
Cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights have no right (for example) to follow our 
previous example, to say what women should wear, but they certainly have a right to be 
employed in ensuring a respect for women’s inalienable and fundamental freedoms and 
dignity. It is not the place of anyone but observant Muslim women to choose to wear or 
not wear the veil (again, a question of taqlîd) ; it is a fundamental Human Rights to say 
they should have the right to decide whether or not to wear it of their own free will, free 
of coercion or threat. Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice do not seek to change all 
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parts of culture, but rather limit the degree to which individuals may be subject to the 
arbitrary accidents of their birth (taqlîd).  
 
Nussbaum and Human Capabilities 
 
This idea finds link-minded, and quite elegantly articulated, support in the work of the 
eminent contemporary American philosopher Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum posits a 
series of human capabilities to compliment and actualize Human Rights. While a full 
discussion of her framework is outside the scope of this work, her writing about the role 
of Human Rights (and capabilities) is very apropos:  
 
 “[A]ll human rights, are best seen as occasions for choice, areas of freedom: thus a 
person can have all ten capabilities on my list without using all of them, and this is true 
of rights as well. A person may have the right to religious freedom, for example, in a 
secure form, and care nothing about religion (see also Sen, 2004, p. 335). The central 
reason why capabilities and not the associated functions are held to be central goals of 
government is that it would be wrong for government to push people into functioning in 
these areas, since citizens reasonably differ over which functions they will choose and 
which they will not. In this way the capabilities, like human rights approaches, avoids 
being ‘imperialistic,’ or imposing a single lifestyle on all. Instead, it asks governments to 
create and protect contexts of choice.” (Nussbaum, 2011, p.35)  
 
Nussbaum not only clearly articulates the idea of Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice 
as providing a sandbox for governments (and also, more broadly, cultures and societies) 
but turns the idea of cultural relativism on its head. In short, by asking (or rather, 
normatively insisting) that contexts of choice be provided to all people (acknowledging 
their rights to rights), it places the onus of justification on those who remove or restrict 
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rights, not in those who grant and protect them. In short, instead of Human Rights being 
seen as contrived and unnatural it is rather up to those who would wish to deny 
fundamental rights to explain why, in rational terms, without reference to the contingent 
taqlîd of their socialization, how such actions would be justified. Moreover, Nussbaum’s 
view that Human Rights represent occasions for choice fits perfectly with Kant’s view of 
freedom as our fundamental right, of Kant and Arendt’s view of the inalienability of our 
right to rights and Rawls’ first principle of justice, namely that all rational people would 
agree to a set of equal rights and liberties required to underwrite the fundamental interests 
of free and equal citizens.  
 
To follow with our example of the rights of women, Human Rights and cosmopolitan 
justice should create a sandbox which limits the degree to which any culture or society 
can arbitrarily coerce any person, including women, who are born into it. These new 
limits mean that for example, women everywhere can no longer be considered the de 
facto or de juris inferiors of men under the preposterous reasoning that being born female 
disqualifies them from full citizenship or moral consideration (according to the 
conception of cosmopolitan justice advanced herein by Rawls, Kant, Arendt, Pogge and 
Nussbaum). It is not surprising that the elites of societies and states which base 
themselves on essentialized and reductionist identities (especially of a religious or 
national/ethnic persuasion) which are not subject to open and honest debate are 
powerfully opposed to having their authority limited by a sandbox defined by 
fundamental Human Rights. 
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What we Mean by Cosmopolitan Justice 
 
Having covered a considerable amount of material relating to the definition of 
cosmopolitan justice, it is important to advance a synthesized and concise definition for 
subsequent use in the remainder of this work. At the same point, it is necessary to explain 
how fundamental Human Rights represent a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice. 
 
First, we hold that the Kantian assertion of freedom as the fundamental Human Right is 
the basis of cosmopolitan justice. This fundamental freedom leads to the right to rights 
posited by both Kant and Arendt and the responsibility to demand respect and not be 
treated as mere means. Human Rights represent, as Nussbaum argues, the contexts of free 
choice we enjoy in virtue of our pre-political humanity and our inherent right to be 
treated as ends.  
 
Secondly, we hold that, following the thought experiment of the Rawlsian original 
position provides a intuitive basis for cosmopolitan justice in accord with the previous 
points. Not only do all people have rights by virtue of their humanity alone but all 
rational people would agree to a set of equal rights and liberties required to underwrite 
the fundamental interests of free and equal citizens (i.e., Human Rights). Moreover, the 
innovation of the veil of ignorance ensures that – to the degree possible- the taqlîd of 
contingent socialization and other arbitrary circumstances of birth would not discolor this 
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conclusion; inasmuch, Human Rights can be said to be just in a cosmopolitan sense both 
in application and derivation.  
 
Thirdly, we reiterate Pogge’s three part qualification of cosmopolitan justice – it applies 
to individuals, regardless of the circumstances of their birth in all places and it is the 
responsibility of all people to respect these rights.  We maintain that cosmopolitan justice 
thus understood represents principles of justice which are applicable regardless of time or 
place (Mandle, 2006; Pogge, 2005). 
 
It is also worth mentioning that the use of the term cosmopolitan justice in this paper 
bears no relation to the, even more controversial, idea of cosmopolitanism in its literal 
sense (i.e., advocating for a world state or the idea of cosmopolitan justice as the ultimate 
justness of a world state and/or relatedly the injustice of existing borders).  
 
What we have outlined is, of course, a conception of cosmopolitan justice emerging from 
a western and liberal perspective but, as we will argue, we do not believe this 
compromises its claims to cosmopolitanism. Our understanding of cosmopolitan justice 
in this work is distinct from (but not mutually exclusive with) the principle of liberal 
universalism as it deals exclusively with fundamental Human Rights as defined  herein. 
It is useful, in evaluating this claim, to briefly compare this Rawlsian version of 
cosmopolitan justice with those advanced by a pertinent alternative claim to 
cosmopolitan justice advanced in recent times: communism. 
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With communism, we can actually argue that it was simply an alternative path towards 
Human Rights. Putting aside communism’s obvious failings in its real world dictatorial 
application, at an ideational level it was necessarily about the equality of all people and 
the need to promote and install a fair and just distribution of society’s goods (justice as 
fairness revisited). Moreover, in its real world application communism was often 
accompanied by the large scale granting of Human Rights (in theory if not in practice), 
not the least of which was the empowerment of women as witnessed in both the Soviet 
Union and Maoist China. Inasmuch, communism does not represent a radical alternative 
to cosmopolitan justice and is arguably better understood as an alternative roadmap to its 
own form of distributive justice.  
PART II: Literature Review 
 
Let us turn now to the contemporary debate surrounding Human Rights and cosmopolitan 
justice in academic literature and consider the place of this work within that larger 
discussion. 
 
Given that we will subsequently present an overview of the historical evolution and inter-
relation of the ideas of cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights in the Western canon, we 
will focus here on the more contemporary aspects of the debate. 
 
Needless to say, it would be beyond the scope of this work to provide an overview of all 
literature touching on cosmopolitanism and Human Rights. Rather, we will limit our 
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subject matter specifically to those works which address the debate between the 
universality and relativity of Human Rights. 
 
Relativism vs. Universalism 
 
 
The current literature on Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice can largely be classified 
as focusing on and tending to one or another end of a relativist - universalist continuum.  
 
Within the relativist portion of this continuum, those on the more extreme end would 
argue that normative assumptions are irreconcilably linked to culture (i.e., there can be no 
cosmopolitan justice) and cannot be held to any outside standard (i.e., a fundamental 
Human Right). The more extreme end of cultural relativism is well described in this 
excerpt from Pathak: 
 
“... [T]o a cultural relativist, a document such as the (Universal) Declaration (of Human 
Rights) seems a futile proclamation derived from moral principles valid in one culture 
and not entirely acceptable in others, and any attempt to establish a congruency in 
different national systems appear bound to fail, because any such attempt would be 
incapable of eroding the irreducible core of cultural singularity in various social 
components of the world. There is a need to remember that each culture insists on its own 
moral superiority, there being few which tolerate a cultural egalitarianism.” (Pathak, 
1989, p.8) 
 
 
Turning from such relative extremism, the ontological position of a more moderate 
cultural relativism would hold that the protection of fundamental Human Rights (the right 
to rights) are just in a cosmopolitan sense as a check on the most extreme examples of 
injustice (Plantilla & Raj, 1997). Moving beyond this toward the centre of the continuum, 
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a weaker cultural relativism would permit the idea that Human Rights are largely a 
manifestation of cosmopolitan justice but can be subject to secondary cultural 
modifications (Donnelly, 1993, p.109-110). 
 
Considerable thought on the relativist side of the spectrum is more concerned with the 
possibly totalizing, hierarchical and tyrannical implications of labeling anything, even 
Human Rights, as being a product of cosmopolitan justice. Some scholars source this in 
the historical precedent of the abuse of the concept of Human Rights: 
 
“The diversity of cultures and the failure of the Universal Declaration to be a truly 
universal document suggests the difficulty of one culture dictating morality to another. 
This can be insidious even if in the name of such a noble ideal as human rights. Noble 
ideals can be twisted to serve ignoble purposes. Throughout Western history, a number of 
injustices have been couched in human rights jargon [such as in the colonial enterprise]. 
Within Western nations, human rights have been around for some time but were once 
only extended to whites, or males, or adults, or property owners, or heterosexuals, or 
Christians [or Anglicans, or Puritans, or Catholics, as the case may be]. Deductive 
reasoning suggests that groups denied equal human rights must not be fully human." 
(Holeman 1987: 209-211 ) 
 
 
One of the most important differences between the cultural relativist and universalist ends 
of the spectrum for the purposes of this work is the difference in perception of 
universalism, with a special focus on Kantian universalism. It is no accident that the 
totality of scholars used to construct our framework of Human Rights as cosmopolitan 
justice are Kantian (including Kant himself) – but for some this very concept smacks 
necessarily of cultural imperialism: 
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"In the first place, it asserts that rules about morality vary from place to place. Secondly, 
it asserts that the way to understand this variety is to place it in its cultural context. And, 
in the third place, it asserts that moral claims derive from, and are enmeshed in, a 
cultural context which is itself the source of their validity. There is no universal morality, 
because the history of the world is the story of the plurality of cultures, and the attempt to 
assert universality, or even Kant's procedural principle of 'universability', as a criterion 
of all morality, is a more or less well-disguised version of the imperial routine of trying 
to make the values of a particular culture general." [Vincent 1986: 37] 
 
 
Indeed, going beyond Kant, some scholars take a more communitarian bent and disagree 
with the very ontology of Liberalism and its essential view of humanity (upon which 
Human Rights are arguably predicated): 
 
"...[An] abstract, ahistorical notion of being human translate into universal and 
potentially imperialistic notions of human rights. If human rights are not linked to 
membership in the institutions of society, neither are they linked to the cultures which 
create the institutions. Liberalism defines humans in transhistorical, transcultural terms. 
Thus it conceives human rights in transhistorical, transcultural terms. From the 
perspective of non-Western philosophies of life, as Marxism and Hinduism, such a view 
fails to address the needs of persons as they exist in their historical-cultural milieu. It 
abstracts individuals from society and grants rights to the abstraction, not to any 
empirically extant being. From the standpoint of Western liberalism, viewing humans and 
human rights in abstract terms has the advantage of offering a transcendent reference 
point from which to judge injustice that is being condoned at the cultural level. It is thus 
suggested that a dialectical relation between abstract and historical conceptions of 
humanity, which in turn makes possible a rapprochement between universal and cultural 
conceptions of human rights is best.” (Holeman, 1987, p.217).  
 
 
As we progress from the relativist to universalist end of the spectrum, we can see an 
immediate ontological shift. First, in reference to the irrevocably Western nature of 
Human Rights; it is useful to contrast the relativist positions of Pathak and Holeman on 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with those of scholars with a universalist 
perspective: 
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“The Universal Declaration does not affirm the institutions Westerners often equate with 
human rights, such as parliaments or supreme courts, but rather allows for various 
cultural forms by simply setting forth those political, social, and economic rights that 
contribute to the dignity of the individual person. "(Traer 1991:158) 
 
Moreover, some authors go further, making an argument similar to that advanced in this 
work, that Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice have transformed the West and cannot 
be understood to be inherently Western: 
 
 "The universal human rights of the second period (after 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights) are as new for the West as they are for China. Less than 50 years have 
passed since both cultural spheres were confronted with such a universal conception for 
the first time.” (Senger 1993: 292). 
 
Why Explore Human Rights as Cosmopolitan Justice? 
 
It is clear, even from this relatively limited sample, that the debate surrounding Human 
Rights and cosmopolitan justice is incredibly rich. Touching on maximalist vs. 
minimalist interpretations of the applicability of Rawls, the cosmopolitan vs. 
communitarian debate, relativism vs. universalism and the debate between post-
modernism and modernism, Human Rights as cosmopolitan justice is a subject at the 
nexus of much of contemporary scholarship. 
 
The focus and approach of this work in relation to the considerable scholarship on the 
subject must be clarified. This piece first seeks to render explicit and reclaim the 
fundamentally Kantian nature of this debate; too often the debate on the applicability of 
Rawls devolves into a historically anemic question of interpretation if Rawls is not placed 
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properly within a larger Kantian perspective. In doing so we hope to provide greater 
context and historical relevance to the current debate and provide a clearer understanding 
of its origins. 
 
Secondly, working with the ideas of preeminent contemporary scholars Pogge and Beitz, 
this work also builds on and contributes to the arguments in favour of the universal 
applicability of Rawls, implicitly endorsing the Kantian idea of the world representing a 
contiguous moral community.   
 
Third, by addressing the historically specific challenges to the conception of Human 
Rights as cosmopolitan justice represented by Asian values and equating the relationship 
between Human Rights, cosmopolitan justice and liberal democracy with cultural 
imperialism, we seek to address relevant real-world issues.  
 
Asian values, first given the sheer portion of humanity residing in Asia and the rising 
influence of Asian powers, are a question of the utmost contemporary importance. 
Secondly, Asian values are worthy of consideration as Human Rights can understandably 
be perceived as Western and have been used abusively in the past and this is important 
aspect of the debate surrounding Human Rights. Thirdly, it is important to engage with 
the claims of Asian values especially where they call into account fundamental rights 
(like those of women) and where governments advancing them seek to relativize the 
protection of fundamental rights.  
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The claims laid against Human Rights as cosmopolitan justice that Human Rights 
represent cultural imperialism as they read like a blueprint for liberal democracy is 
equally in need of urgent attention. For arguably the first time in history, the majority of 
people on Earth on united in the belief that some form of representative democracy is the 
best system of governance. This is an unprecedented moment in world history and 
obviously an enormous challenge to entrenched illiberal and antidemocratic governments 
and systems. By exploring the considerable argumentation against such an interpretation 
and its attempt to invalidate Human Rights and their claim to cosmopolitan justice, we 
are able to provide a considered response to such a position. 
 
Lastly,t his work seeks to make the important distinction between ideal and fundamental 
Human Rights a key part of the discussions surrounding the cosmopolitan justness of 
Human Rights. By re-focusing on the theoretical basis, with special emphasis on Arendt’s 
irrevocable and fundamental right to rights, we can clarify discussions as to whether or 
not rights have a claim to cosmopolitan justness. This is especially important in ensuring 
that fundamental rights are not called into question along with ideal rights as this would 
be akin to throwing the baby out with the bathwater. As noted by Bielefeldt: 
 
“The universality of human rights does not mean the glbal imposition of a particular set 
of Western values, but instead, aims at the universal recognition of pluralism and 
difference - different religions, cultures, political convictions, ways of life - insofar as 
such difference expresses unfathomable potential of human existence and the dignity of 
the persons. To be sure, pluralism and difference apply also to the concept of human 
rights which itself remains open - and must be open - to different and conflicting 
interpretations in our pluralistic and multicultural political world. Without the 
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recognition of such difference within the human rights debate, the discourse would 
amount to cultural imperialism. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the very idea of human 
rights precludes some political practices, such as oppression of dissidents, discrimination 
against minorities, slavery and apartheid.” (Bielefeldt 1995: 594) 
 
Why is This Work Relevant? 
The central purpose of this paper is to explore the question of whether Human Rights are 
a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice (and the moral cosmopolitanism which 
underwrites it). This arguably represents, a worthy and timely intellectual exercise. This 
paper, however, is written in the opinion that cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights are 
also a question of a much more visceral and practical importance and that to discuss them 
is inherently more than mere curiosity or debate. In this light, the question at hand can be 
said to relevant for both practical and academic reasons and the framework of political 
theory especially well suited to its analysis.  
 
First, from a practical perspective, this paper seeks to explore evidence that Human 
Rights are a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice. We are constantly reminded through 
reports of discrimination, war and repressive governments of the importance and practical 
utility of fundamental Human Rights and of the normative and practical utility of a 
cosmopolitan standard of justice to which we can appeal. From this point of view, the 
question of whether Human Rights represent a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice in 
real-world application is of vital importance.  This work has been undertaken with the 
understanding that it is crucial that the legitimacy of Human Rights be buttressed so that, 
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not only can the global framework of Human Rights continue to expand in scope, 
application and legitimacy but so that it has strong foundations with which to meet any 
challenges. The most serious challenge, ontologically, seems to be whether or not Human 
Rights are truly the reflection of cosmopolitan justice, hence why the question needs to 
be examined. 
 
Moreover, such real-world questions are now of increasing and urgent concern given the 
rising power of non-Western and illiberal states and the consequently more plural and 
complex conversation surrounding existing international Human Rights regimes and the 
concept of cosmopolitan justice which underwrites them; there are many examples of 
such challenges to choose from. First, and perhaps most pressingly, is the rise of China 
and its seemingly inevitable accession to super-power status along with, and conceivably 
even surpassing, the United States. While avoiding xenophobic scaremongering, it is 
reasonable to be concerned that – for the first time in two centuries – the world’s most 
powerful state will be totalitarian, undemocratic, illiberal and openly hostile to the liberal 
international order and the principles of cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights which 
are central to it. If Human Rights do not have a convincing claim to cosmopolitanism – 
and are instead seen as mere Western rhetoric – how can they survive such challenges? 
 
Similarly and more broadly, the world continues to struggle with fanatical forms of 
religion and nationalism which oppose themselves to inalienable Human Rights as 
cosmopolitan justice because these two principles undermine the totalistic authority of 
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essentialized religious and national identities. In particular, the current and widespread 
convulsions of the Islamic world (including but not limited to terrorism against the West, 
the recent In Amenas incident, the ongoing civil war in Mali, unrest in Egypt, civil war in 
Syria, Taliban violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan and Uighur uprisings in China) 
represent a contentious area for Human Rights, especially where liberal movements (in 
the anti-fundamentalist not strictly ideological sense) must confront extremism. In the 
case of both nationalism and religious zealotry it is necessary, if Human Rights are to 
hold any sway at all, that they must be rooted in what can be said to be a cosmopolitan 
conception of justice. 
 
As these examples, among so many others, bear witness, establishing whether Human 
Rights are a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice is an especially important practical 
concern at this time.   
 
Having established the importance and relevance of the question, we must now ask if the 
framework of political theory is well suited to explore it? Admittedly, this seems like 
something of a rhetorical question. Obviously the discussion of philosophical principles 
(cosmopolitan morality and justice) and their real-world manifestation (Human Rights) 
and the consideration of the political and theoretical/ontological critiques offered are 
political theory in the purest form.  But, to frame it in classic political theory terms (and 
why ever shouldn’t we?), while we have demonstrated that it is feasible to address the 
subject matter from a political theory framework we must also offer evidence that is 
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desirable; inasmuch as such evidence is available it is to be found in the words of Isaiah 
Berlin: 
 
“[T]here has, perhaps, been no time in modern history when so large a number of human 
beings, in both the East and the West, have had their notions, and indeed their lives, so 
deeply altered, and in some cases violently upset, by fanatically held social and political 
doctrines. (This is) dangerous, because when ideas are neglected by those who ought to 
attend to them - that is to say, those who have been trained to think critically about ideas 
- they sometimes acquire an unchecked momentum and an irresistible power over 
multitudes of men that may grow too violent to be affected by rational criticism.” (Berlin, 
1952, p.1) 
 
In a practical sense then, we live in a world where ideas have great, and possibly undue, 
tangible influence over the lives of great numbers of people who may have only the 
vaguest familiarity with them. There is a requirement, given the central place of Human 
Rights in the prevailing international order, to attend to these ideas precisely as Berlin 
maintains.   
 
Moreover, by exploring this question of Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice this 
work seeks to complement the theoretical debate within philosophy surrounding both the 
source and motivation for Human Rights. A significant body of philosophical academic 
work exists which seeks to establish the genesis and justification for Human Rights – 
while this is undoubtedly useful, it is also useful to approach from the lens of political 
theory. Hannah Arendt explained the difference between philosophy and political theory 
(Zur Person, 1958) in terms of the implicit impartiality of natural philosophy versus the 
necessarily partial nature of political discussions (indeed, this partiality is arguably what 
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makes it political as such). In this light, exploring Human Rights as a manifestation of 
cosmopolitan justice is done in the hope of strengthening the case for Human Rights from 
a politically engaged point of view.  
 
Inasmuch, this work will contribute to the literature of both Human Rights and 
cosmopolitan justice (and the considerable literature which broaches the two). By 
providing a comprehensive consideration of the claims to cosmopolitan justice of 
fundamental Human Rights, this work can provide interlocutors on related subjects a 
fruitful and concise overview.  
 
PART III: A Brief History of the Idea of Cosmopolitan Justice and Human Rights 
 
Ancient Origins 
 
More than intellectual curiosity demands that we review, however superficially, the 
historical evolution of the ideas of, and ideas related to, cosmopolitan justice and Human 
Rights. The idea of a community transcending the parochial as well as basic and 
universal rights can both claim origins in classical civilization. As we trace their 
evolution we can see how their evolutions are distinct yet profoundly inter-related and 
mutually reinforcing.   
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In the traditional Western canonical narrative, the earliest recorded expression of the idea 
of cosmopolitanism can be traced back to the founder of the school of Cynic philosophy, 
Diogenes of Sinope. In the 4
th
 Century BCE Diogenes is credited with coining the term 
cosmopolitan when he declared "I am a citizen of the world”, the original Greek term 
being cosmopolites (Epictetus, 2008, s24.66). It is worth noting that this first expression 
of cosmopolitanism dates to the period in which the Greek city-state poleis were 
subsumed within the Pan-Hellenic empire of Alexander the Great and the idea of the 
cosmopolitan became both theoretically and practically relevant. The conception of 
cosmopolitanism advanced by the Cynics was not being attached to any particular place, 
as we shall see subsequently, a more refined and familiar understanding of 
cosmopolitanism would be advanced by the Stoics. 
 
Human Rights can claim an equally ancient – if contentious - lineage, being traced back 
to a first codification and expression by Cyrus the Great in his famed 6
th
 Century BCE 
Babylonian Cylinder, which has been described  as the world’s first Human Rights 
charter. Such opinions are counterweighed by opposed academic opinion, including by 
the British Museum which holds the cylinder, which maintain that this is a 
misinterpretation (The British Museum, 2013). For the remainder of its historical 
development Human Rights (i.e., rights which inalienably belong to all people) is linked, 
as we shall see, to the story of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan justice.  
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Returning to the main historical reconstruction of the development of moral 
cosmopolitanism, we can see that it became an important part, as mentioned, of Stoic 
thought. Epictetus noted as much in his Discourses dating from 108 CE, in which he 
stated: “Each human being is primarily a citizen of his own commonwealth; but he is 
also a member of the great city of gods and men, where of the city political is only a 
copy.” (Epictetus, 2008, s5.26).  We see than that Stoic cosmopolitanism, which informs 
our conception of moral cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights today, 
is about belonging to a moral community encompassing all of humanity. Inasmuch it is 
distinct and in some ways opposed to the Cynic version.  
 
This Western channel by which these two conceptions of cosmopolitanism found their 
way from classical Greek thought to the modern period is the intellectual tradition we 
have come to know as medieval scholasticism. Thomism (the body of thought inspired by 
Saint Thomas Aquinas) in particular asserted inherent equality of all before God and by 
virtue of natural law, providing the groundwork for a cosmopolitan conception of justice 
in which all were inherently equal. After all, if all beings are equal before God, it stands 
to reason that there is one manner of organizing such beings most justly and one 
evaluative standard of justice by which to assess it (McInerny & O’Callaghan 2010, 
s11.1).  
 
It is however important to keep in mind that during this time, while ideas of universal 
morality such as this were articulated, they were not necessarily conceived of in terms of 
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a global application. It is important to remember that this was a relatively insular age for 
Europe – certainly not the dark ages of Enlightenment caricature – but much less 
globalized than during the seafaring Imperial ages to follow. Debates about morality were 
mostly concerned with the domestic sphere and we will see how these differing historical 
contexts help to shape the debate around these ideas.  
 
To permit a brief diversion, it is worth noting that during this period in 1297 an important 
document in the history of Human Rights – the Magna Carta – was promulgated. 
Originally only a guarantee of privileges for the aristocracy from the King, the document 
went on to be very influential and represents, in the words of famed theorist and jurist 
Hersch Lauterpacht “that the very notion of rights of the individual against the power of 
the state struck deep roots in European consciousness” (Lauterpacht, 2009, p.93).  
 
Returning to our principal narrative, it should come as little surprise that in the early 
modern period, cosmopolitan justice, as we understand it, was discussed very little and, 
where it was, was conflated with the emerging European understanding of natural and 
international law. The universalism, both of validity and application, of natural and 
international law intertwined them with what we would now described as cosmopolitan 
justice. There are some exceptions, notably the venerable Humanist philosopher Erasmus 
of Rotterdam who drew directly on ancient cosmopolitan concepts to make a case for a 
global peace.  In his Querela Pacis, Erasmus maintains that basic human sociability is the 
basis for this world peace and claims that individuals who subscribe to this idea form a 
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community of compatriots (i.e., a supra-national community not defined in religious 
terms like Christendom or the Umma which were the principle models of supra-national 
communities at the time) (Erasmus, 1986). Nevertheless, the majority of cosmopolitan 
thought in this time remains focused on international relations and not on devising a set 
of universally applicable norms.  
  
Cosmopolitanism, Exploration and Enlightenment  
 
It was during the late Age of Discovery (15
th
 to 17
th
 century) and early Age of 
Enlightenment (17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries) that cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights 
began to emerge as more cogent concepts. The reasons for this emergence are open to 
conjecture. It can be argued  that The Age of Exploration rapidly expanded the European 
worldview; the discovery of entirely new continents and encounters with varied peoples 
and cultures provided a frame of reference which previous generations could scarcely 
have imagined. Moreover, The Enlightenment, for its part, built on the Renaissance’s 
appropriation of Classical philosophy and provided unprecedented exposure to the ideas 
of the Classics, including the not small place accorded in the Classics to cosmopolitan 
ideals in both Cynic and Stoic philosophy. One could also argue that the emergence 
across Europe of an international intellectual exchange provided the basis for a viewpoint 
which prided itself on rejecting parochialism and embracing membership in a trans-
national community (Brown & Kleingeld, 2013).  
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As the 18
th
 century began, cosmopolitanism was a term of various meanings and was not 
necessarily a label indicative of a particular philosophical conviction, but rather a 
description of a more general intellectual perspective. Some of the greatest (or, at the 
very least, most famous) thinkers of the age including Voltaire, Mostesquieu, Hume and 
Diderot self-identified as cosmopolitans in this sense (Brown & Kleingeld, 2013, s.1.2). 
Yet, as the century progressed, this looser concept of cosmopolitanism interacted with 
natural law and the emerging philosophy of liberalism; from this interaction emerged the 
radical ideas which are the subject of this work – the idea of cosmopolitan justice and its 
manifestation in the idea of universal Human Rights.  
 
As the century progressed, the Cynic tradition of cosmopolitanism as rootlessness, gained 
a few famous and infamous followers. Despite being a distinct from, and in many ways 
opposed to, the emerging more Stoic cosmopolitan vein of thought, those who identified 
as cosmopolitans in a Cynic sense inspired much opposition to cosmopolitanism as a 
whole (Brown & Kleingeld, 2013, s1.2).; Rousseau claimed, for example, that 
cosmopolitans: “..[B]oast that they love everyone, to have the right to love no one” 
(1997, p.158). More important, however, in the late 18
th
 century was the growing 
synthesis of natural law, existing Stoic cosmopolitan thought and nascent liberalism into 
a new moral cosmopolitanism which informed cosmopolitan justice and underwrote the 
radical concept of Human Rights. This line of thought, much more in the Stoic vein, was 
almost the opposite of Cynic cosmopolitanism. 
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One of the most important leaps towards this revived Stoic vein was made by Thomas 
Hobbes.  In his famed work Leviathan, published in 1651, Hobbes described a state of 
nature which did not meaningfully involve a deity. Hobbes pioneered, at least in the 
modern sense, the idea of a quasi-secular natural right predicated only on nature, and 
therefore inherent to each person (Zagorin, 2009, p.2-10, p.100).  Hobbes was careful to 
distinguish between natural rights (an absence of obligations) and natural law 
(obligations). He posited that the fundamental right of man was:  
 
"to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is 
to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own 
judgement, and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto." (Hobbes, 
1993, s.1).  
 
While hardly in line with the more utopian underpinnings of moral cosmopolitanism and 
Human Rights, the fundamental principle that a human being has rights derived from 
their humanity, and not from divine or legal sources, is the foundational concept of 
Human Rights and moral cosmopolitanism as we have defined them.  Needless to say 
Hobbes’ removal of the divine and the political context from the equation was not a clean 
break. The later liberal thinker Locke would draw heavily on this Christian concept of 
equality and on the idea of natural law for his political theory (Waldron, 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, this renewed stoic vein of cosmopolitan thought, instead of negating 
belonging to a human community (as did cynic cosmopolitanism), expanded the moral 
reference community to the entirety of humanity.  By the late 18
th
 century a cosmopolitan 
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idea of justice much more familiar to the modern variant was articulated by the venerable 
liberal philosopher, Immanuel Kant.  
  
Kant famously, and radically, argued that all rational beings are part of a single moral 
community.  Many of his works touch on the subject, so for the sake of brevity we can 
take the iconic work Perpetual Peace by Kant to explore his articulation of the idea. 
Written in 1795, the work is celebrated not only for its articulation of what is now known 
as the Democratic Peace Theory, but also for discussing what Kant called “the 
cosmopolitan ethic” (Kant, 1983, p.119). Kant makes the claim that “Because a (narrower 
or wider) community widely prevails among the Earth’s peoples, a transgression of rights 
in one place in the world is felt everywhere.” (Kant 1983, p.119). Kant says flatly that the 
world is one moral community and that if we really believe this,  we have a duty to 
uphold these same liberal rights for everyone, everywhere. For another relevant example 
from the Kantian canon, we can turn to the Fifth Thesis of Kant’s Idea for a Universal 
History With a Cosmopolitan Intent: “The great problem for the human species, whose 
solution nature compels it to seek, is to achieve a universal civil society administered in 
accord with the right” (Kant 1983, p.33). Again here, Kant argues that there is a standard 
of evaluative and normative cosmopolitan justice for everyone and that nature compels us 
to further its realization. It is important for us to take the time to appreciate the radicalism 
of these statements within the context of their own time. The epochal changes of the 
Enlightenment challenged millennia of political and religious authority and, as seen here 
in Kant’s works, posited an entirely opposite form of authority; instead of the top down 
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provision of rights at the king or clergy’s discretion, all people are rather empowered by 
virtue of simply being human beings.  
 
Declarations and Detractors 
 
As evidenced by the works above, the late 18
th
 century was the point where theoretical 
cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights arguably broke through to become of practical 
relevance. At the same time Kant was publishing his epochal new framework for moral 
cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights were being proclaimed as 
revolutionary political fact. As mentioned in the introduction of this work, the American 
Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the Declarations of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen from 1789 and 1793 respectively, represent the transformational real-world 
application of cosmopolitan justice.  
 
Such powerful political and ideational changes did not go unchallenged.  In particular, 
the French revolution and its claims relating to cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights 
became the centre of heated debate pitting proponents of this new moral cosmopolitanism 
against opponents. This crisis, at the outset of the practical application of moral 
cosmopolitanism and Human Rights in real world political affairs is worth exploring in 
greater detail. Among the most famous rejections of these ideas in the French revolution 
was the argument put forward by Jeremy Bentham – despite his being an enthusiastic 
advocate of political and legal rights, and the revolution for that matter. Bentham was 
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affronted by the very idea of natural rights advanced by the French revolutionaries. He 
viewed them as utopian and supercilious, stating: “[R]eason for wishing that a certain 
right were established, is not that right; want is not supply; hunger is not bread” and 
went on to state that the very principle of “natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and 
imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts.”(Harrison, 1995, p.87). 
From the current perspective it is worth noting that Bentham’s argument proves valid in 
hindsight; as a relentless and avant garde campaigner for Human Rights in his own time, 
he made the important observation that these rights must be legally enshrined to be 
useful. The subesequent gradual codification and adoption of Human Rights has proven 
his point, in that simply wishing for Human Rights or claiming their innate existence is 
indeed insufficient. Human Rights must be written into law to effect the lives of vast 
majority of persons. 
 
Let us return from this diversion to the fray with perhaps the most famous attack on the 
French Revolution and its concept of innate Human Rights, that advanced by British 
philosopher Edmund Burke. In his work, Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke 
advanced a criticism in a similar vein to Bentham, focusing on the impracticality of 
simply proclaiming Human Rights, noting:  
 
“'What is the use of discussing a man's abstract right to food or to medicine? The 
question is upon the method of procuring and administering them. In this deliberation I 
shall always advise to call in the aid of the farmer and the physician, rather than the 
professor.” (Burke, 2006, p.144).  
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Burke goes on to question the very logic of natural rights – claiming that rights flow from 
legal and political histories (i.e., the Magna Carta and English Bill of Rights) and are not 
universally applicable. Inasmuch, we can conclude that each people (i.e., the French, the 
Germans, the British, etc.,) are entitled to different rights according to the development of 
their respective political cultures and frameworks. Burke re-asserts the supremacy of 
political authority (ultimately, in his pro-monarchical view, flowing from God) as the 
source of rights. 
 
Bentham and Burke however, were not the only commentators on the portentous events 
on the Continent. Others came out strongly in favour of the French Revolution and 
specifically in favour of its conception of moral cosmopolitanism and Human Rights. 
Among the many defenders of the concept, it is perhaps best for the continuity of our 
discussion to consider the elegant work of Thomas Paine, whose work was written as a 
direct riposte to Burke’s strident criticism. In this work, Paine’s Reflections on the 
Revolution in France, the author very clearly elucidates both the practical and theoretical 
strengths of this concept of rights, stating that: 
 
“ Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his existence. Of this kind 
are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and also all those rights of acting as 
an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural 
rights of others. Civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of being a member 
of society. Every civil right has for its foundation, some natural right pre-existing in the 
individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases, 
sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and protection.” 
(Paine, 1985, p.68).  
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Paine clearly argues against Burke, claiming that all civil rights are not based on the 
specific legal or political tradition of a people but rather in a natural pre-existing right in 
the individual. This claim again supports the radical Hobbesian, Kantian and French 
Revolutionary claim that such rights are derived from one’s humanity and not granted by 
the divine, a powerful and controversial claim in a Europe still governed by monarchs 
claiming divine authority.  
 
In short, moral cosmopolitanism and Human Rights as politically substantive forces burst 
out from the ideational into the physical world in an extraordinary way. The 19
th
 century 
was replete with struggles for and against moral cosmopolitanism and Human Rights and 
is a story with which the majority of us are largely familiar. The 19
th
 century debates 
surrounding the abolition of slavery, the spread of democracy from America and Britain 
around the world and the transformative debates surrounding emancipation and franchise 
all involved the powerful claims of these two revolutionary ideas.  
 
Human Rights and Cosmopolitan Justice in the 20
th
 Century 
 
In the 20
th
 century, Human Rights and moral cosmopolitanism reached first terrible new 
lows, followed by remarkable new highs. The horror of the First World War gave birth to 
the unprecedented League of Nations, seemingly an embodiment of Kant’s cosmopolitan 
ideals. The League (or rather its members) failed to its permanent discredit to check the 
violent and enthusiastic abuse of Human Rights and the rejection of moral 
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cosmopolitanism by much of the world, with the most notorious examples being Nazi 
Germany and Imperial Japan. These two states let loose a methodical assault on Human 
Rights by asserting totalistic ideological frameworks in which people were not only 
discriminated against but brutally dehumanized. The horrific and unprecedented scale of 
the conflict provided a powerful impetus for the creation of a new order to guarantee 
peace; moral cosmopolitanism and Human Rights were to find themselves central to this 
new order (Lauren, 1998; Morsink, 1999; Glendon, 2001). As the tide turned against the 
Axis powers and the Allies began to defeat and sign peace treaties with vanquished 
opponents (including Japan, Germany, Italy and other European adversaries), the Allies 
demanded the inclusion of provisions for Human Rights, a theretofore unprecedented step 
(Henkin, 1990, p.22-29). The Allies went on to found the United Nations in 1945 and 
included, in the founding charter as one of the purposes of the new organization: 
 
“To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” (U.N., 2012).  
 
Born to extreme contention in modern form from the paradigmatic shifts of the late 18
th
 
century, Human Rights and moral cosmopolitan found themselves, less than 200 years 
later, enshrined as a central purpose of the most broadly subscribed and collaborative 
institution in history; endorsed – at least theoretically - by every major power on Earth. 
While not binding, the very fact that Human Rights could be articulated and promulgated 
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as a shared goal valid everywhere around the world, represents a remarkable achievement 
for what was, indeed still is, such a radical idea.  
 
In light of this self-appointed purpose, the member states of the United Nations agreed 
that it was both necessary and desirable to draw up an international bill of rights, 
applicable irrespective of political or cultural milieu. The product of this effort was the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Morsink, 1999; Glendon, 2001).  The 
Declaration is not binding, but is considered recommendatory and laid the foundation for 
the remarkable expansion of the international Human Rights regime that has proceeded 
apace since its adoption (Morsink, 1999; Nickel, 2013). The Declaration was quickly 
followed by the 1953 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, an international treaty which was binding upon countries that 
ratified it and included mechanisms for enforcement (Council of Europe, 2013; Nickel, 
2013). The European model has witnessed significant emulation via the widespread 
proliferation of regional Human Rights mechanisms, including those of the Organization 
of American States (OAS), the African Union (AU) and the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Of equal importance to both the practical adoption and 
philosophical development of Human Rights were the Helsinki Accords. The Accords 
were the culmination of 3 years of negotiations between the Western and Eastern blocs 
aimed at defusing tensions between these rivals in Europe (Molineu, 1978) and were the 
antecedent of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Among 
the promulgations at the end of these negotiations was the Helsinki Final Act, a 10 part 
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document of which the 7
th
 chapter specifically dealt with respect for Human Rights 
(CSCE, 2013). The spirit of the accord can be gleaned from the following excerpt: 
“The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including 
the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language or religion. 
They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, 
social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.” (CSCE, 
2013) 
 
This marked a watershed moment for Human Rights in the Eastern bloc and provided a 
reference point for those pushing for political change within the Soviet sphere. In 
particular, the establishment of the Moscow Helsinki Group (an NGO designed to 
monitor respect for the Human Rights enumerated in the Helsinki accord) and similar 
organizations across the Easter Bloc dramatically changed the practical and ideological 
place of Human Rights within the lives of Eastern Bloc citizens by entrenching them as 
accepted norms and creating reporting mechanisms designed to hold governments to 
account (National Security Archive, 2006). 
Indeed, what has largely followed since the post-war period has been a cycle of mutual 
reinforcement in which Human Rights treaties and mechanisms have built on and been 
inspired by their predecessors . In particular the U.N. has worked to create Human Rights 
treaties which impose legally binding requirements on signatories; this approached has 
been very successful and, as of 2013: “Every UN member state is a party to one or more 
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of the six major human rights treaties. 80% of states have ratified four or more” 
(Bayefsky, 2001, s.i).  
 
The Contemporary Debate  
 
The expanding international Human Rights regime has continued to evolve, with two 
remarkable developments in the last 15 years.  
 
The first is the International Criminal Court (I.C.C). The I.C.C. came into existence when 
more than 120 countries had ratified the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court 
in 1998.  Its function is to serve as a backup to national systems and address the most 
egregious war crimes and abuses of Human Rights. The creation of such a court is a 
remarkable challenge to the traditional idea of the supermacy of state sovereignty. Many 
countries, including the United States, China and much of the Middle East have not 
ratified the treaty, but it remains an important institution. The I.C.C. is predicated on 
moral cosmopolitanism and the upholding of Human Rights and is arguably a step toward 
the cosmopolitan order as envisaged by Kant, one in which people hold rights in virtue of 
being citizens of the world and not due to membership in particular cultural or political 
communities.  
 
The second is the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) initiative by the United 
Nations in 2005. R2P is a mechanism meant to protect people in any country from the 
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most serious violations of their Human Rights. The foundational document of the R2P 
initiative states that governments have a responsibility to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and their incitement 
(UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, 2012). If a government 
fails to do so, the international community has a responsibility to use all means, up to and 
including military force, to protect the fundamental Human Rights of any country’s 
citizens from egregious violation. This is again another remarkable prioritization of 
fundamental Human Rights over state sovereignty (and ideal Human Rights) based on a 
moral cosmopolitan standard.  
 
Yet, despite the extraordinary expansion and deepening of Human Rights since the end of 
the Second World War, there is nevertheless still a great deal of debate on the subject. In 
particular, as mentioned in the introduction, many authoritarian, theocratic and otherwise 
despotic countries have questioned or sought to undermine the credibility of Human 
Rights as a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice. Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew led the call with China and Iran for more flexibility over international standards of 
Human Rights at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna.  
Representatives from other countries, led by Western democracies, saw this as attempts 
by recalcitrant and oppressive regimes to legitimate their refusals to maintain basic 
international standards of Human Rights.  
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This view has subsequently been supported by preliminary empirical research which 
seems to indicate that Human Rights have strong international support and are understood 
to be just around the world (and, inasmuch, can be considered cosmopolitan).  When 
asked about a wide range of Human Rights (including freedom of expression, freedom 
from ethnic and/or racial discrimination, the rights of women, etc.,) a majority of those 
polled in all countries (including in China, Russia and Iran) were in support of 
international standards of Human Rights. Moreover, there was a surprising rate of support 
(62%) in China for the U.N. to actively and “intrusively” promote Human Rights within 
the country (Council on Foreign Relations, 2011).  
 
Pro-Human Rights delegates offered strong resistance and the conference came together 
to issue the Vienna Declaration, including Article 5 which addresses the challenge to 
Human Rights put forward: 
 
“All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on 
the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and 
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must 
be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and 
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 
(United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration, 1993). 
 
We can see from this back and forth that the debate around moral cosmopolitanism and 
Human Rights is still active. More importantly, and perhaps ominously, we can see that 
much opposition to the concept of cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights comes from 
an ascendant East Asia and in particular, as mentioned in the introduction, China.  
50 
 
However, the tentative empirical evidence compiled by the Council on Foreign Relations 
discussed above shows that while debate continues primarily in academic and 
government spheres, Human Rights and moral cosmopolitanism have overwhelming 
public support across the world; no small feat given that the international Human Rights 
regime born out of the ashes of WWII is less than 70 years old.  
 
Part IV: Addressing Criticisms of Human Rights as Cosmopolitanism Justice 
Having traced the development – both ideationally and practically – of contemporary 
cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights we can now turn to addressing some of the 
arguments against Human Rights as a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice. Specifically, 
we will address the two most important criticisms of the cosmopolitan claims of Human 
Rights in recent years, those of western and cultural imperialism, both emerging from 
post-colonial theory. The main arguments leveled by such thinkers against cosmopolitan 
justice can be categorized as accusations of imperialism. For the purposes of clarity and 
comprehensibility each argument will be considered in turn, we will consider the 
arguments that claim that cosmopolitan justice and/or Human Rights represent cultural 
imperialism and/or western imperialism. We will begin each section by considering the 
specific claims of the argument and then, in turn, respond to the criticism advanced.  
 
While there are many schools of thought which, to one degree or another, would debate 
the pedigree of cosmopolitan justice claimed by Human Rights, it is not possible to 
address them all within this work. Communitarian thought, for example, would maintain 
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that cosmopolitan morality is very weak, if at all possible, given the powerful role of 
culture in delimiting our moral universes (Hutchings, 2010, p.11). Inasmuch, a degree of 
parsimony and a focus on contemporary real world challenges to Human Rights (as 
outlined previously) has led us to specifically focus on the two imperial criticisms offered 
by post-colonial inspired scholars against the cosmopolitan claims of Human Rights (and 
the idea of cosmopolitan justice). Post-colonialism is arguably the most logical point of 
departure for criticisms as it specifically focuses on the systemic repression and 
acculturation of the world by European powers and peoples. Since Human Rights largely 
emerged from the West and lay claim to being just in a cosmopolitan sense, it shares an 
ideational genesis if not likeness to much colonialism. For Human Rights to be truly just 
in a cosmopolitan sense, they would require to not be imperially imposed. As seen in our 
earlier definitions, imperialism necessarily negates Human Rights on their own terms 
through its coercive and hierarchical structure and, indeed, ontology. Human Rights need 
to have powerful and legitimate normative claims which are not contingent upon western 
or cultural imperialism if they are to be considered just in a cosmopolitan sense. Since 
post-colonial thought has been based on engaging and analyzing such hegemony and the 
historically hypocritical claims to cosmopolitan justice of the West, it is an excellent 
milieu in which to test if Human Rights are a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice as we 
have advanced.  
 
Before we plunge ourselves into examples and criticisms it is important to clarify that we 
are not choosing examples for the elucidation of our arguments with the intent of 
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commenting on any culture or society. We do hold that the definition of cosmopolitan 
justice advanced in this work is normatively desirable but the examples we will use 
subsequently are used as they offer clear cases where cosmopolitan justice, as we have 
defined it, has been a key factor and because they offer examples of cosmopolitan 
applicability. In order to be as clear as possible in the definition of cosmopolitan justice 
being used, we repeat below that given earlier, so it can be fresh in our minds. 
 
First, we hold that the Kantian assertion of freedom as the fundamental Human Right is 
the basis of cosmopolitan justice. This fundamental freedom leads to the right to rights 
posited by both Kant and Arendt and the responsibility to demand respect and not be 
treated as mere means. Human Rights represent, as Nussbaum argues, the contexts of free 
choice we enjoy in virtue of our pre-political humanity and our inherent right to be 
treated as ends.  
 
Secondly, we hold that, following the thought experiment of the Rawlsian original 
position provides an intuitive basis for cosmopolitan justice in accord with the previous 
points. Not only do all people have rights by virtue of their humanity alone but all 
rational people would agree to a set of equal rights and liberties required to underwrite 
the fundamental interests of free and equal citizens (i.e., Human Rights). Moreover, the 
innovation of the veil of ignorance ensures that – to the degree possible- the taqlîd of 
contingent socialization and other arbitrary circumstances of birth would not discolor this 
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conclusion; inasmuch, Human Rights can be said to be just in a cosmopolitan sense both 
in application and derivation.  
 
Thirdly, we reiterate Pogge’s three part qualification of cosmopolitan justice – it applies 
to individuals, regardless of the circumstances of their birth in all places and it is the 
responsibility of all people to respect these rights.  We maintain that cosmopolitan justice 
thus understood represents principles of justice which transcend time and place (Beitz, 
1997; Mandle, 2006; Pogge, 2005). 
 
Cultural Imperialism 
 
The first imperial criticism of cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights that we shall 
address is that they constitute a form of cultural imperialism (Binder,1999; Mutua, 2005, 
p.52-55; Tan, 2004, p.8; Zafirovski, 2007).  
  
The term cultural imperialism is a highly charged one, replete with pejorative meaning 
and can sometimes arguably verge on the polemic. It is therefore important for us to be 
careful in using it – a great diversity of meanings have been assigned to the term since it 
first rose to prominence in the 1960’s (Tomlinson, 2001). So, in order to address the idea 
that Human Rights represent a form of cultural imperialism we must first establish 
precisely what we mean by that.  
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Cultural imperialism is a term rooted in and informed by the post-colonial school of 
critical theory and communications studies. Cultural imperialism has many meanings 
specific to situations (i.e., within the context of media, governance, norms, etc.,) in which 
it is employed; what unites all of its uses is that they describe the propagation of cultural 
hegemony.  
 
As mentioned, the term emerged in a rapidly decolonizing world in the 1960s, during 
which scholars from the developing world began to critically examine colonialism and its 
effects. In order for us to more clearly understand cultural imperialism within the context 
of our debate, it is useful to look at a formal definition from scholars who use the term: 
 
"Imperialism is the conquest and control of one country by a more powerful one. Cultural 
imperialism signifies the dimensions of the process that go beyond economic exploitation 
or military force. In the history of colonialism, (i.e., the form of imperialism in which the 
government of the colony is run directly by foreigners), the educational and media 
systems of many Third World countries have been set up as replicas of those in Britain, 
France, or the United States and carry their values. Western advertising has made 
further inroads, as have architectural and fashion styles. Subtly but powerfully, the 
message has often been insinuated that Western cultures are superior to the cultures of 
the Third World." (Downing, Mohammadi, and Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1995, p.482) 
 
This definition clarifies for us that Human Rights as cultural imperialism would mean 
that, subtly, most of the world is obliquely forced to accept Human Rights as superior 
and, inasmuch, they do not represent a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice but rather 
simply the writ of Western cultural hegemony. Before going any further, we must 
disentangle, for the purposes of this paper, cultural and western imperialism; we will 
address the two separately. The accusation of cultural imperialism against Human Rights 
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is specifically the debate surrounding whether Human Rights can meaningfully claim to 
be cosmopolitan. 
 
The basic assumption of cosmopolitan justice as we have defined it is that people are 
everywhere part of a contiguous and shared moral community and that a practical and 
normative imperative exists to respect and extend the fundamental rights of all persons, 
held in virtue of their humanity alone and separate from any divine or political agency. 
Fundamental Human Rights arguably are or should be the reification and reflection of 
this morally cosmopolitan point of view. This claim to cosmopolitan justice for Human 
Rights would be seriously (if not totally) compromised if in fact Human Rights 
represented little more than hegemonic Western rhetoric maintained via cultural 
imperialism. 
 
Moral Cosmopolitan and Liberal Democracy 
 
To consider this, let us engage this debate with one of more widely encountered 
contemporary accusations of cultural imperialism against Human Rights: if Human 
Rights are, in fact, a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice why then do they seem to read 
like a blueprint for liberal democracy? Is this not precisely an example of cultural 
imperialism whereby the powerful and liberal inspired international order pushes these 
values by stealth? (Langlois, 2003, p.990-1000; Mutua, 2004, p.52-55) Instead of being 
based in cosmopolitan justice, can Human Rights be understood as merely an arbitrary 
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framework within which anything varying from Western, liberal orthodoxy is considered 
inadequate, deviant and inferior?  
 
There is much to be said for these arguments, but it perhaps worth considering that 
Human Rights read like a blueprint for liberal democracy in the modern world because 
liberal democracies have arguably been the most successful in enshrining and protecting 
them (Donnelly, 1999; UN – UNHCR, 2012). As noted in our definition of terms, 
communism at one point seemed to offer a viable alternative path toward Human Rights 
so, prior to popular disillusionment with communism in practice, there was a time when 
the very same Human Rights which are taken to read like a blueprint for liberal 
democracy could equally have read like a blueprint for a utopian communist state.  
 
Human Rights and democracy also offer convincing historical and theoretical claims to 
cosmopolitanism which can help to explain why Human Rights read like a blueprint for 
liberal democracy (i.e., it is the system which has heretofore been accepted as most 
universally just by the majority of people on earth). Significant empirical evidence exists 
to suggest that democracy is “virtually the only political model with global appeal” 
(Inglehart, 2003, p.52) and enjoys overwhelming endorsement across the world’s 
continents and cultures (Dalton & Ngu-Ngoc, 2005; Gallup, 2005; Heath, 2005; 
Ingelhart, 2003; Park & Shin, 2006; Tessler, 2002). This in itself shows that democracy is 
seen as part, or a product, of cosmopolitan justice.  
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Moreover, the fundamental principles of democracy are very much in accord with 
cosmopolitan justice as we have defined it. Democracy, by empowering each person, 
provides at least the freedom to vote (and, we can conclude, be treated with at least a 
modicum of respect) and voting can create a context (if not always free) of choice. 
Moreover, it can be argued that Human Rights in the absence of democracy exist only at 
the caprice of a ruling elite and not as an inviolate right (Langlois, 2003, p.1002). 
 
Furthermore, drawing on the Rawlsian argument we have advanced, not only do all 
people have rights by virtue of their humanity alone but it can be argued, through the 
original position,  that all rational people would agree to a set of equal rights and liberties 
required to underwrite the fundamental interests of free and equal citizens – otherwise 
put, fundamental Human Rights in a democratic framework. Support for this idea can be 
inferred from the prevailing political realities which surround us today. 
 
It is first worth nothing that basic mechanical (if not substantive) principles of democracy 
– voting and representation – are feigned, where not practiced, by all but the most 
repressive regimes (including de facto authoritarian states like Iran and China) and are 
the principles by which the United Nations and other international organizations are 
administered. As an example of this principle of democratic legitimacy, we need look no 
further than the recent vote in the General Assembly to accord non-member observer 
state status to Palestine (UN, 2012) – this vote occurred and was perceived as more just 
as the General Assembly is a more egalitarian and democratically representative forum 
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than the veto-bound Security Council. The 2005 Gallup Global Attitudes survey supports 
this argument, finding that: “8 out of 10 global citizens believe that in spite of its 
limitations, democracy is the best form of government” (Gallup, 2005) .  
 
In this light, even where states only employ democracy in its barest mechanical form (one 
party elections in Singapore, communist party rule in China, theocratic elections in Iran, 
etc.,) they are still willing to go to the trouble of going through the motions of democratic 
legitimacy (co-opting the legitimacy of its cosmopolitan justice much in the same way 
imperialist movements co-opted cosmopolitan justice to further their own ultimately anti-
cosmopolitan ends). 
 
Inasmuch, we are offered further proof that the basic principles of democracy can 
arguably be said to have normative power and tacit acceptance across much of the world 
(as they would, arguably, from the starting point of the original position as posited) 
(Gallup, 2005; Ingelhart, 2003). Democracy is seen as producing more just outcomes and 
is seen as both a manifestation of and protection for fundamental Human Rights (Pew, 
2003; UN - UNHRC, 2012). It makes sense then to reverse the idea that cultural 
imperialism is what makes Human Rights read like a blueprint for liberal democracy; it is 
rather that the protection of Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice are so far best 
embodied and guaranteed by liberal democracy and hence the system is seen as the most 
just as a result (CFR, 2012; Pew, 2003). If another system were to provide a more 
convincing claim to popular legitimacy and was deemed better suited to the protection of 
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Human Rights it is perfectly conceivable that Human Rights would become associated 
with reading like a blueprint for that system (as we have mentioned, communism once 
might have been).  
 
For the moment, critics who maintain that Human Rights, given that they read like a 
blueprint for liberal democracy, are a form of cultural imperialism are arguably confusing 
the extraordinary attraction and persuasiveness of these systems rooted in cosmopolitan 
justice with the coercion implicit in imperialism. Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice 
are the very opposite in that they need not be imposed but have been, and continue to be, 
sought out by people around the world (CFR, 2012; Pew, 2003)  
 
Authoritarian Critics 
 
At this point it is worth turning our attention to the question of what contemporary forms 
of government tend to most argue the case for Human Rights being a manifestation of 
cultural imperialism and not cosmopolitan justice? Most often, these criticisms emerge 
from authoritarian, theocratic or otherwise tyrannical regimes; examples of modern 
opposition to Human Rights have emerged from China and Iran (at the 1993 Vienna 
Conference) or the Islamic bloc at the U.N. (as evidenced by its opposition to the 
inclusion of provisions for sexual orientation in the U.N. Human Rights framework) (UN 
Watch, 2012). It is normal that tension exists between the overwhelming international 
endorsement of Human Rights as just in a cosmopolitan sense and the actions of these 
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countries. Authoritarian, theocratic or otherwise tyrannical regimes are predicated on 
stifling debate – the creation of this alternative totalistic reality is key to all totalitarian 
movements as noted by Hannah Arendt: 
 
“Before they seize power and establish a world according to their doctrines, totalitarian 
movements conjure up a lying world of consistency which is more adequate to the needs 
of the human mind than reality itself; in which, through sheer imagination, uprooted 
masses can feel at home and are spared the never-ending shocks which real life and real 
experiences deal to human beings and their expectations. The force possessed by 
totalitarian propaganda -- before the movements have the power to drop iron curtains to 
prevent anyone's disturbing, by the slightest reality, the gruesome quiet of an entirely 
imaginary world--lies in its ability to shut the masses off from the real world." (Arendt, 
1986)  
 
Essentially, Arendt captures the idea perfectly that all such repressive regimes must stifle 
debate on their basic principles (as witnessed by the severe punishment, often including 
execution, for heresy in much of the Islamic world (Saeed, 2011) and the violent 
repression of debate in China and other authoritarian countries) and by the assignation of 
essentialized identities at birth (i.e., national or religious fundamentalism, etc.,). Human 
Rights and cosmopolitan justice are understandably discomforting to such orders as 
standards which empower and value the individual and encourage questioning authority 
represent an existential threat. Human Rights are the product of a complex and centuries 
long process of intellectual and political debate and, from many historical and ideational 
examples we have seen, are very persuasive and empowering to and for individuals (and, 
as seen, enjoy widespread popular support). For totalitarian regimes of one stripe or 
another the powerful claim to cosmopolitan justice of fundamental Human Rights (and its 
rejection of cultural relativism) are anathema; to permit debate about the central ideas of 
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their societal orders (and their comparison to a cosmopolitan standard) would be to 
destabilize their absolute hold on power. As we have seen from historical example, 
Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice provide the means for people living under such 
orders to free themselves and change their societies. The words of Kant noted more than 
200 years ago apply aptly: 
 
“Our age is the age of criticism, to which everything must submit. Religion through its 
holiness and legislation through its majesty commonly seek to exempt themselves from it. 
But in this way they excite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to 
that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand 
its free and public examination” (Kant, 1998, s.Axi). 
 
Repressive governments (through their majesty) and the theocracies of the world 
(through their holiness) excite precisely this suspicion – both from without and more 
importantly from within. Their accusations of cultural imperialism against Human Rights 
as a cosmopolitan conception of justice and blueprint for liberal democracy are rooted in 
the fact that they cannot accept to be held to account to any exterior standard of behavior 
or evaluation (Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice) as they are all too well aware 
how poorly they would fare under an analysis of this kind.  
 
All of these fact considered, the fact that fundamental Human Rights are accused of 
representing a blueprint for liberal democracy is not something that should be denied as it 
is arguably true, though for different reasons than its critics maintain. What needs to be 
questioned is the claim that this represents a form of cultural imperialism; illiberal elites 
would like to play to the trope of a meddling imperial West imposing its beliefs on others 
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but the evidence rather suggests that most of the world’s people see Human Rights and 
democracy as the most just system available. The opposition voiced by the Chinese or 
Iranian regimes (or indeed by overzealous supporters of American hegemony) at being 
held to account according to Human Rights are arguably much more about discrediting 
the powerful normative claims to cosmopolitan justice made by their internal dissenters 
or external opponents than about any real concern of cultural imperialism.  
 
Far from being proof of cultural imperialism, the overwhelming global perception of the 
justness of democracy as a form of government (Dalton & Ngu-Ngoc, 2005; Gallup, 
2005; Heath, 2005; Ingelhart, 2003; Park & Shin, 2006; Tessler, 2002), the global desire 
for fundamental Human Rights (CFR, 2012; Pew, 2003) and the association of the two as 
being related and mutually reinforcing (Pew, 2003; UN - UNHRC, 2012) strengthens our 
claims for the cosmopolitan justness of Human Rights. Human Rights and democracy are 
not synonymous but they are evidence suggests they are clearly related. 
 
Western Imperialism  
Turning now from cultural imperialism we will analyze a similar, yet sufficiently distinct, 
criticism offered of cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights: that they represent a form of 
Western imperialism. We have purposefully addressed this criticism in isolation after 
having addressed claims of cultural imperialism. Western imperialism is, of course, 
arguably a blanket term which covers could include cultural imperialism, but for the ends 
of this paper we wanted to address specifically the claim that Human Rights and 
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cosmopolitan justice are uniquely a form of Western imperialism, distinct from being 
rooted in the broader effects of Western power (as seen in analyses of criticisms claiming 
Human Rights represent cultural imperialism). 
 
The argument that Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice are forms of Western 
imperialism can be summarized as the idea that Human Rights represents a Western idea 
which through the military, political, economic and cultural force of that Western world 
has been imposed on the rest of the world. This is an important point to consider in that 
many non-Western countries (including in Asia) have adopted and promoted Human 
Rights. Looking to the preamble of the constitution of Japan, we find an endorsement of 
Human Rights and cosmopolitanism: “We believe that no nation is responsible to itself 
alone, but that laws of political morality are universal” (Kantei, 2013). For India’s part, 
Human Rights are enshrined as Fundamental Rights in section III of the Indian 
Consitution (Basu, 1993). In this light, what does it mean for Human Rights to be 
Western? And, if Human Rights are somehow intrinsically Western, does is really impact 
the claim that Human Rights are a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice?  
 
As witnessed in our examination of cultural imperialism, it is clear that there is a 
legitimate historical basis for much of the world to be concerned about imperialism, 
especially when rooted in the West (which has heretofore been the most successful and 
widespread in its colonialism) and when rooted in appeals to cosmopolitan justice. What 
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is not quite as clear is the idea that Human Rights (especially in their contemporary form) 
are Western as such.  
 
 
How Western are Human Rights? 
 
Indeed, saying that Human Rights are Western necessarily begs the question: what is 
Western? If it is merely a designation of origin – the same way that gun powder is 
Chinese or zero is Indian – then that is simply a statement of fact. However, we must be 
aware that Western in this sense rather means to imply Human Rights are not derived 
from a cosmopolitan conception of justice but are simply a product of parochial Western 
culture and therefore inappropriate to apply or introduce outside of a Western context. 
This idea is more contentious and, this work will advance, not supported by substantive 
historical fact.  
 
First, to simply label Human Rights Western is arguably superficial. Since their 
introduction into Western political life through the American and French revolutions at 
the end of the 18
th
 century, Human Rights posited as a manifestation of cosmopolitan 
justice have been a transformative forced within Western society. Cosmopolitan justice 
and Human Rights have proven a transformational evaluative mechanism which has 
catalyzed an extensive reorganization where not an outright metamorphosis of much of 
was traditional Western culture.  
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In many ways, the present Western world is best understood as a liberal and not strictly 
Western civilization. This point is not mere semantics – the 19th century campaign 
against slavery, the large scale overthrow of Christian theocracy and aristocratic 
authority, the extension of suffrage first to men, then to women and the emancipatory 
campaigns against discrimination against different religions, sexualities, races and 
ethnicities have all been rooted in cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights. These 
changes have altered the social, ethical and political fabric of the Western world in 
unprecedented ways. Human Rights did not destroy Western culture, rather they simply 
transformed those parts of it which were incompatible with the protection of fundamental 
freedoms (principally the arbitrary authority of government, society and religion). It is 
important to mention, moreover, that this is an ongoing process (as mentioned previously, 
we are witnessing a gay civil rights movement which is transforming the Western world 
according to concepts of Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice). The West has 
certainly not reached any sort of panacea of Human Rights but is dynamically changing 
and continually engaging with cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights. 
 
Moreover, the historical narrative which underwrites accusations of Western imperialism 
against Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice cannot be reconciled with the 
fundamental role played by Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice in dismantling 
Western imperial systems. Sustained and profound opposition to imperialism was 
generated from within the Western world from the very outset of colonial expansion 
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within a cosmopolitan framework [by Kant, 1983, p.90; Diderot (Muthu, 2003, 75-77) 
and Smith (Kohn, 2013) among others]. Furthermore, as we shall subsequently explore, it 
was arguably the empowering logic and ethos of cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights 
which provided colonized and subjugated peoples with the necessary framework to 
demonstrate and articulate the theoretical and practical tyranny of imperial rule. In short, 
while Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice are undoubtedly products of the West they 
arguable cannot be legitimately labeled Western imperialism.   
 
In this light, what does it mean for Human Rights to be Western? And, if Human Rights 
are somehow intrinsically Western, does is really impact the claim that Human Rights are 
a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice? 
 
Asian Exceptionalism or Essentialism? 
 
It is always useful to consider ideas through consideration of a real world example. And 
what better real world example to use in a discussion of Human Rights and Western 
imperialism than one of the most oft-quoted critics of the Occident, Lee Kuan Yew, the 
former Prime Minister of Singapore.  
Mr. Lee is a particularly apt choice in that he famously led Singapore, in conjunction 
with Iran, Malaysia and China, in a campaign to challenge the universality of Human 
Rights and the international system in place to protect them. At the 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (to which we made reference earlier) Singapore 
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advanced the argument that Human Rights as theretofore enumerated represented an 
unjustifiably Western social standard and did not take into account what was described as 
unique “East Asian values”. This argument had originally emerged in the regional 
conferences held in advance of the Vienna conference in the early 1990s.   
In short, the argument was advanced that Human Rights as heretofore enumerated 
represented a Western system and worldview, incompatible with Asian society (Milner, 
1999, p.56-58). Asian values, conceived of as a counter-balance to the Human Rights 
regime imposed on the East by the West, are essentially a rejection of personal 
empowerment. Asian values draw heavily from orthodox Confucianism; inasmuch, the 
Confucian value of filial piety meant that loyalty towards hierarchical authority was 
promoted, personal freedom was to be curtailed and subsumed into collective efforts and 
hard work and thriftiness were to be celebrated as means of social progress (Bell, 2000; 
Chan, 1999). Asian values, commensurately, would de-emphasize some existing Human 
Rights including the rights of women and democratic participation (Bell, 2000; Chan, 
1999). 
Proponents of Asian values advanced multiple arguments in their favour. Among these 
arguments are the idea that it is reasonable to attribute a certain degree of Asia’s 
economic success to specifically Asian values (Sopiee, 1995, p.180-185), as a 
counterbalance to the perceived excessive individualism and lack of social concern of 
Western values (Milner, 1999, p.58-62) and the idea that in developing modern political 
cultures, Asia must ground these conceptions in an organic and local understanding and 
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not wholly import Western models. All of these points are, arguably, eminently 
reasonable and quite correct but – in light of the subject of this paper – beg the question: 
what do they have to do with fundamental Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice? 
Aren’t such values rather more a matter of taqlîd? Certainly they are important in 
negotiating the appropriate balance between various forms of Human Rights (cultural, 
social, educational, etc.,) but do they, in any serious way, negate the right to fundamental 
rights of cosmopolitan justice? 
In order to better answer that question, let us consider the ideas of Asian values as 
advanced in light of the arguments and ideas we have thus far covered. To begin with, 
before discussing these ideas it is important to understand the history and context from 
which these debates emerged. Internationally in 1993, the recent fall of the Soviet Union 
before the West heralded in the eyes of many the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy 
and, as Fukuyama so famously put it, the end of history, at least politically speaking. 
Domestically, Singapore and Malaysia were in the midst of unprecedented economic 
growth as Asian Tigers (Milner, 1999). These two countries, made up of different 
proportions of Muslim Malays, Hindu Indians and Buddhist and Confucian Chinese were 
keen to advance a new identity which provided them a binding force to quell ethnic and 
religious tensions and allow them to continue their politically controlled economic 
growth (Milner, 1999). China, rapidly transforming into the economic colossus it has 
become thanks to Deng Xiaoping’s late 1980’s reforms was still suffering from the 
international condemnation surrounding the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. Iran, 
for its part, was only 14 years into its new Islamic state and 5 years out of its brutal war 
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with Iraq, making for a very precarious position for its leadership, especially with the 
collapse of its Soviet allies (Rubinstein, 1981, p.605-610). In short, each had a domestic 
reason to shore up legitimacy for their respective forms of nationalistic and religious 
authoritarianism and de-legitimize the international Human Rights regime, now pushed 
forward unabated by the newly unchallenged West.  
In this light we can see why a grouping of more or less authoritarian regimes and 
movements would be interested in maintaining their power. Such groups could shore up 
their authority by embracing essentializing national/regional and religious identities and 
making them sacred and innate and therefore beyond accountability to fundamental 
Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice. Moreover, it is worth noting that Asian values 
read rather conveniently like a blue print for the state-led, authoritarian capitalism of 
those Asian countries (Singapore, China and Malaysia) which most strongly advocated 
for Asian values (Kanishka, 1997). Inasmuch, it is also plain to see that Asian values 
serve the interests of the current dominant ruling classes in these countries, especially by 
foregrounding the Confucian value of respect for authority to delegitimize their 
opponents as “un-Asian” or disrespectful (Milner, 1999).  
Additionally, we must ask (as we did about the idea of something being Western) how 
any of the values advanced as Asian can be seriously so deemed? Asia is the most 
populous and diverse continent on the planet. As noted by Amartya Sen in his piece 
Democracy as a Universal Value, it is absurd to argue that anything can be labeled Asian 
values, given the extraordinary diversity of the continent, to say nothing of the ongoing 
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and profound ideological conflicts across religious, national and ethnic lines across the 
continent (Milner, 1999). The term Asian in Asian values is therefore better understood 
to refer to conservative and sometimes chauvinistic Confucianism and not anything 
transcendently or unifyingly Asian as such. Arguably then, the term Asian was simply 
adopted to contrast with the supposed Western nature of Human Rights to serve as a 
reductionist binary compatible with the thinking of those who criticize Human Rights as 
Western imperialism. None of this is to say that Asian values do not or cannot exist, 
especially not in a more narrowly defined cultural sinosphere, which excludes West, 
Central and South Asia, where Chinese culture has and does form a common foundation. 
However, if such Asian values are to be enumerated it should be a bottom-up and indeed 
collective enterprise, not the project of a technocratic and authoritarian elite and should 
be done with respect to the fundamental Human Rights of all persons, including all those 
residing in Asia.  
Indeed, to return to our earlier point, much of what was advanced as Asian values was in 
no way incommensurate with Human Rights except where such values sought to 
legitimize egregious injustices, most visibly in the insidious and patriarchal 
disempowerment of women advanced as an Asian value (Chan, 1999; Claude, 2003; Bell 
2000). As noted by a focus group on Human Rights in Bangkok, Asian attendees did not 
agree with the idea that spousal abuse, though sanctioned in traditional Asian Values, 
should be permitted as it violates Human Rights (Claude, 2003, p.258)The Confucian 
principle of filial piety, the emphasis on collective achievement and the celebration of 
thrift as a means of self-advancement are arguably not the kind of thing one associates 
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with a discussion of fundamental Human Rights; using our own test established at the 
beginning of this work, we can see that a failure to observe filial piety may be socially 
outré in East Asia but hardly constitutes an egregious violation of justice. Within the 
West, and indeed across the world, there are a great diversity of taqlîd which manage to 
exist within the framework of cosmopolitan justice and fundamental Human Rights. All 
that changes is that cultures and governments simply have to respect the inviolate nature 
of fundamental Human Rights to prevent any government or culture being unjustly 
demanding or abusive to persons born into their respective cultures or states. Human 
Rights and cosmopolitan justice are understandably contentious in despotic systems as 
they provide the means for the assertion of personal rights against the culture, society and 
political order into which one is born. In this vein, it is notable that Asian values also 
attracted criticism from Lee Teng-Hui and Kim Dae Jung, the democratically elected 
Presidents of Taiwan and South Korea respectively, who both re-asserted the universality 
of Human Rights (Fetzer and Soper, 2007, p.144). 
Inasmuch, the idea that Asian values are in conflict with the West or Human Rights is 
arguably inaccurate and Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice have important roles in 
protecting the large portion of humanity residing in Asia from abuses of their 
fundamental rights. As this paper was being written in the late Winter of 2013, it was 
possible to casually visit the website of BBC News and come across myriad examples of 
struggles for Human Rights across Asia including the first book about being a gay 
Afghan published by a man who escaped to Canada to live his sexuality in peace (BBC, 
2013), the struggle of women in China against the state’s instrumentalization and 
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reduction of their lives according to a reproductive imperative (BBC, 2013) and the 
ongoing struggle for Human Rights under Iran’s brutal and intransigent theocracy (BBC, 
2013). Indeed, most damning for the case of Asian values as being more specifically East 
Asian, there are articles which show that more than 100 prominent academics in China 
have released an open letter calling on the central government to ratify international 
Human Rights treaties (BBC, 2013) and, contrary to Mr. Lee’s assertion that the Asian 
value of filial piety promotes societal harmony and cohesion, an account of a strike in 
Singapore disproportionately repressed via exaggerated prison terms (BBC, 2013).   
All of these cases show that whatever the cultural milieu, Human Rights and 
cosmopolitan justice reflect basic and undeniable rights that people, from the ground up, 
aspire to have protected (CFR, 2012; Pew, 2003). Accusations of Western imperialism 
are superficially persuasive but do not withstand more rigorous consideration. 
Fundamental Human Rights as a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice are perfectly 
compatible with the legitimate social distinctness of East Asia (or indeed, any other part 
of the world for that matter). That there should be some friction with our local taqlîd 
when considered by the standards of Human Rights is natural (as witnessed by the 
ongoing gay rights movement in the West); that this happens as well in Asia does not 
undermine the cosmopolitan justice of Human Rights but rather shows how human 
communities across the world react similarly when dealing with important social change. 
Just as in the West, governments across the world must contend with their people’s right 
to rights – that they will, and should, do so according to the cultural framework of their 
historical communities should go without saying. 
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PART V : Human Rights as Cosmopolitan Justice in Perspective 
 
If one were to summarize, however superficially, our analysis of the preceding criticisms 
of Human Rights which label the concept a product of cultural or Western imperialism, 
what would one say? Arguably, the answer would be that there exists considerable 
theoretical and historical evidence to support the claim that Human Rights are a 
manifestation of cosmopolitan justice. However, it would need to include the caveat that 
Human Rights and claims to cosmopolitan justice offer such powerful normative 
endorsement that they have been hijacked repeatedly and to great effect by imperialist 
(and other movements). Moreover, in their hijacking, appeal to cosmopolitan justice 
and/or Human Rights have served as the pretext for the brutal denial of real-world 
Human Rights. Inasmuch, the lesson of such criticisms is that we must be extremely wary 
of anyone claiming to be acting in the name of cosmopolitan justice and/or Human 
Rights.  
 
Cosmopolitan Justice as Means of Liberation 
 
As we have seen, from the beginning of the enterprise of European colonialism, claims to 
cosmopolitan justice have been used as a convenient pretext for denying the Human 
Rights and access to cosmopolitan justice of people around the world. Nevertheless, it is 
important to recognize that concurrently and in opposition, considerable opinion from the 
same historical periods has railed against the imperialism of the European powers of the 
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age. One need only consider Kant’s praise for Japan and China’s violent refusal to 
interact with the “barbarous” West and general damning indictment of the vapid 
commercialism and injustice of empire to see an example of the most famous thinker of 
the age openly and emphatically opposing imperialism and promoting the ‘cosmopolitan 
right’. (Kant 1983, p.119). An even stronger condemnation of imperialism is to be found 
in Diderot’s scathing piece, the Histoires des Deux Indes – in this work again we see that 
socio-ethical liberals were using cosmopolitan conceptions of justice to condemn this 
form of imperialism (Muhtu 2003, p.75). Diderot condemned the enterprise of 
imperialism for its moral and intellectual costs: 
 
“Let us stop here and place ourselves back in the time when America and India were 
unknown. I address myself to the most cruel of Europeans, and I say to them: there exist 
many regions which will furnish you with rich metals, with appealing clothing, with 
delicious dishes. But read this history and see at what price this discovery is promised to 
you. Do you, or do you not want it to take place? Does one believe that there could be a 
creature so infernal as to say: I want this?” (Diderot via Agnani, 2007, p.65) 
 
Moreover, Diderot was unforgiving in unmasking the underlying hypocrisy, violence and 
barbarism of Europe’s colonial enterprise: 
 
 “What do these forts which you have armed all the beaches with attest to? Your terror 
and the profound hatred of those who surround you. You will no longer be fearful, when 
you are no longer hated. You will no longer be hated, when you are beneficent. The 
barbarian, just like the civilized man, wants to be happy” (Diderot via Agnani, 2007, 
p.65) 
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In short, from even this brief excerpts, we can see that European thinkers immediately 
began using arguments based on cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights to oppose the 
imperialism of their times. 
  
In short, cosmopolitan justice is necessarily opposed to imperialism because, as it has 
since the Stoics, it holds all people to be innately equal and this is precisely the opposite 
of the hierarchical ethos of empire. Moreover, cosmopolitan justice– which necessarily 
includes the idea that everyone possesses and cannot reasonably be denied certain rights 
– is arguably the school of thought which ultimately served to challenge and overthrow 
imperialism. It was this combination of cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights which 
arguably convinced the majority of both the colonized and colonizing that colonialism 
was unjustifiable (Hopkins, 2008), as noted by Hannah Arendt: 
 
"On the whole it [The British Empire] was a failure because of the dichotomy between 
the nation-state's legal principles and the methods needed to oppress other people 
permanently. This failure was neither necessary nor due to ignorance or incompetence. 
British imperialists knew very well that 'administrative massacres' could keep India [or 
Egypt] in bondage, but they also knew that public opinion at home would not stand for 
such measures. Imperialism could have been a success if the nation-state had been 
willing to pay the price, to commit suicide and transform itself into a tyranny. It is one of 
the glories of Europe, and especially of Great Britain, that she preferred to liquidate the 
empire." (Arendt, 1986) 
 
From this we can clearly see and that conceptions of Human Rights and cosmopolitan 
justice (“the nation state’s legal principles”) were central to dismantling the unjustifiable 
imperialism of the British Raj in India. This fact does not undo the horrors done in the 
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name of cosmopolitan justice, but bears witness to the fact that ultimately Human Rights 
was the key ideological tool used to bring colonialism to an end. 
 
Moreover, if we look beyond the rationales within Western metropoles to those freeing 
themselves from colonialism, we strengthen our argument for claiming that Human 
Rights represent a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice by demonstrating how the ideas 
were seen and applied just as organically in non-Western societies.  
 
Let us start then, with perhaps the most famous and influential figure in the resistance 
against European imperialism in Asia, Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi was, implicitly if not 
explicitly, a strong advocate of moral cosmopolitanism and Human Rights. Gandhi 
appealed to these two ideals in his struggle for an independent India, arguing that the 
Indian people – who had been subjected to a racist and unjust hierarchy under the Raj – 
had the same inalienable claim on Human Rights and fundamental freedoms as anyone 
else, including their British administrators (a morally cosmopolitan position). It is also of 
interest to note that Gandhi applied these cosmopolitan norms to radical effect within 
India as well. Gandhi advocated tirelessly for equality by working for the emancipation 
of the untouchables (those at the bottom of the Hindu caste system), for the rights of 
women and for mutual respect and understanding among India’s multifaceted ethnic and 
religious communities (Ambedkar, 1943). Cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights then, 
can be seen not only as enemies of imperialism but of all forms of unjustified restrictions 
and discrimination. Moreover, Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice were ultimately 
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used to dismantle, not maintain, imperialism and were invoked despite attempts by 
Western imperialists to the contrary. To argue that fundamental Human Rights represent 
a form of imperialism (i.e., maintained by force and imposed from above) does not 
withstand historical examples. 
 
More recently, the iconic struggle to end Apartheid, personified by Nelson Mandela, 
provided us with another example of the emancipatory power of cosmopolitan justice and 
Human Rights. The apartheid regime arguably represents Western and cultural 
imperialism at its most chauvinist, arbitrary and brutal; the dispossession of the 
indigenous African population and the subsequent implantation of a violent and 
offensively absurd racial hierarchy ranks among the most egregious of all colonial 
regimes. In struggling against apartheid, Nelson Mandela made great use of a 
cosmopolitan sense of justice and the international norms of Human Rights to appeal 
against the inverted and perverse domestic reality of apartheid South Africa. Like 
Gandhi, Mandela made use of cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights not just to 
challenge the injustice of the colonialism he faced but also made it central to his domestic 
policies in an attempt to create a new and more just South Africa. We can see evidence of 
this commitment in the words of Mandela during his inaugural address as the first 
President elected from a full franchise in South Africa: 
 
 "We enter into a covenant that we shall build a society in which all South Africans, both 
black and white, will be able to walk tall, without and fear in their hearts, assured of 
their inalienable right to human dignity – a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the 
world." (Mandela, Pretoria, 9 May 1994; SAHO, 2011)  
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He built on this theme of inalienable rights in his remarks just weeks later at the opening 
of the first Parliament of post-apartheid South Africa: 
 
"Our single most important challenge is therefore to help establish a social order in 
which the freedom of the individual will truly mean the freedom of the individual. We 
must construct that people-centred society of freedom in such a manner that it guarantees 
the political liberties and the human rights of all our citizens." (Mandela, Cape Town 25 
May 1994; SAHO, 2011) 
 
Mandela’s rhetoric was not empty. As President he was crucial to the establishment of 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which sought to 
document and investigate serious rights abuses during the apartheid regime. Moreover, 
Mandela was heavily involved in the drafting of the new South African constitution 
which included powerful provisions for Human Rights, inspired by the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (Canadian High Commission in South Africa, 2013). In short, he 
used Human Rights as a tool of liberation and sought to bring  the new South Africa up to 
the highest extant standards of cosmopolitan justice. 
 
Having considered the nature of imperialism and its connection to cosmopolitan justice 
and Human Rights, two points become clear. First, Human Rights and cosmopolitan 
justice are extremely normatively persuasive and, inasmuch, are likely to be co-opted by 
movements which seek to fraudulently appeal to their moral authority to mask otherwise 
morally objectionable actions. Secondly, any attempts to deny fundamental Human 
Rights in the name of establishing them (as in the case of many forms of imperialism) in 
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the name of a cosmopolitan/natural justice are illegitimate. Critics who are concerned that 
Human Rights are used only in one of these two ways, to borrow moral authority for 
unworthy causes or to serve as self-negating rhetorical justification against respecting 
Human Rights, are right to be concerned. Nevertheless, as we have seen in our 
examination of the dismantlement of imperialism (both from the perspective of European 
powers and colonies and in contemporaneous reactions to imperialism) Human Rights 
and a sense of cosmopolitan justice were ultimately the normative framework within 
which liberation was possible. Inasmuch, cosmopolitan justice and fundamental Human 
Rights were as central and as conceptually just to Kant as they were to Mandela and 
Gandhi, providing evidence to support their claims to universal validity.   
 
Having considered and engaged with the arguments of those critics who maintain Human 
Rights represent a manifestation of one or more forms of imperialism it is now time for 
us to introduce a framework which supports the claim that Human Rights are a 
manifestation of cosmopolitan justice.  
 
First, we support the position outlined by the United Nations in reference to Human 
Rights, namely that: 
 
“Universal human rights do not impose one cultural standard, rather one legal standard 
of minimum protection necessary for human dignity. As a legal standard adopted through 
the United Nations, universal human rights represent the hard-won consensus of the 
international community, not the cultural imperialism of any particular region or set of 
traditions.  
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Like most areas of international law, universal human rights are a modern achievement, 
new to all cultures. Human rights are neither representative of, nor oriented towards, one 
culture to the exclusion of others. Universal human rights reflect the dynamic, 
coordinated efforts of the international community to achieve and advance a common 
standard and international system of law to protect human dignity.” (Ayton-Shenker, 
1995) 
 
The authority of Human Rights are based in a cosmopolitan conception of justice and 
both the concept of Human Rights and the current Human Rights regime have emerged 
out of a uniquely international and collaborative discussion which spans more than 200 
years of political theory and approximately 70 years and counting politically. Inasmuch, 
they represent the opposite of imperialism (i.e., a hierarchical system imposed from 
above and maintained by power) in their grassroots and power diffusing nature. While 
originally growing out of ideas articulated in the West, they are not intrinsically Western 
and Human Rights have transformed traditional Western culture as much as they have 
changed or are changing other cultures which are attempting to reconcile themselves with 
these basic standards of human dignity.   
 
Case in Point : Mukhtar Mai 
 
Much of the argument for seeing Human Rights as a manifestation of cosmopolitan 
justice can be gleaned from the case of Mukhtar Mai. A consideration of her case in light 
of all that we have thus far seen, with a special focus on the fundamental right to rights 
and the protection against egregious violations of justice, offers a crystallization of the 
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fundamental and cosmopolitan nature of Human Rights both theoretically and practically. 
A brief synopsis from a news report provides a rough outline of the case: 
  
“Nine [Now eleven] years ago, a misogynistic panchayat [traditional South Asian village 
council] of south Punjab ordered the gang rape of a woman [Mukhtar Mai] for no sin of 
hers. It was her (then 12-year-old) brother who was sodomised and then accused of illicit 
relations with the sister of the powerful rapists. This low-caste family [Mukhtar’s family] 
had to be ‘fixed’.”(Rumi, 2011) 
 
Before proceeding any further, it is important to again clarify that we are not selecting the 
case of a Muslim woman to make simplistic or sweeping claims. We do not believe this 
case is indicative of Pakistan or the Islamic world as a whole (indeed, it is more of a 
reflection on the traditional system of local justice than anything Islamic as such). The 
case of Ms. Mai was chosen because it is exceptional and it offers a clear example of a 
situation in a non-Western cultural milieu where Human Rights empowered an individual 
to seek justice. This example, then, is purely chosen to be illustrative and draw attention 
to the cosmopolitan applicability of the principles under discussion.  
 
Returning to the matter at hand, it is the opinion of this work that to be sentenced to gang 
rape for any reason qualifies as an egregious violation of justice (and therefore deserving 
of protection as a fundamental Human Right as we have defined it). To moreover be 
sentenced to gang rape as a result of attempting to pursue those who sexually assaulted 
someone else (in this case, her younger brother) represents a compounding violation of 
his fundamental Human Right to human security. That the taqlîd of her particular 
community held that such punishments were acceptable is irrelevant before the fact that 
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the punishments constitute a gross violation of fundamental Human Rights; in short, the 
panchayat was functioning utterly outside the sandbox of fundamental Human Rights. 
Ms. Mai, after having suffered the horror of her punishment, was expected under the 
local convention to commit suicide to protect her family’s honour (UN, 2006); luckily, 
she decided to break with social convention. Instead, Mukhtar chose to pursue the 
opposite course by going beyond her local tribal justice system. She pursued her case 
within the formal Pakistani legal system empowered by her claim to fundamental Human 
Rights. As Michael Ignatieff notes:  
  
“The  conflict  over  the  universality  of  human  rights  norms  is  a  political  struggle. 
It  pits traditional,  religious, and authoritarian  sources of power against human  rights 
advocates, many of them indigenous to the culture itself, who challenge these sources of 
power in the name of those who find themselves excluded and oppressed” (Ignatieff 
2001, p. 76-77) 
  
The case of Ms. Mai illustrates this point with exceptional clarity. In refusing to commit 
ritual suicide and instead seeking justice through the formal legal system, Ms. Mai was 
making a claim to her fundamental Human Rights through the Pakistani legal system 
against the odious and misogynistic injustice perpetrated against her in name of 
traditional, religious and authoritarian sources as noted by Ignatieff. Put within the 
framework we have thus far advanced, Ms. Mai did not accept the form of justice (if it 
can so be called) borne out of the contingent taqlîd of her culture and sought instead, 
through appeal to the formal court system, to argue for justice in keeping with her 
inalienable rights held in virtue of her pre-political humanity alone (Nussbaum, 2011). As 
this case illustrates, real Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice are a form of grass-
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roots, transformational empowerment. This point is best articulated by those within the 
societies most tangibly struggling to assert Human Rights versus entrenched power, like 
Islamic feminist scholar Haideh Moghissi, who eloquently makes the point that: 
  
“What  they seek  is  protection  of  their  rights  as  individuals  within  their  own  
culture. Authoritarian resistance to their demands invariably takes the form of a defense 
of the culture as a whole against intrusive forms of Western cultural imperialism. In 
reality this relativist case is actually a defense of political and patriarchal power. 
Human rights intervention is warranted not because traditional, patriarchal or religious 
authority is primitive, backward or uncivilized by our standards, but by the standards of 
those whom it oppresses. The warrant for intervention derives from their demands, not 
from ours” (Moghissi, 1999, Part II) 
 
  
Moghissi perfectly captures the source of authority for Human Rights, Ms. Mai was not 
suffering the imposition of an alien moral system (i.e., Human Rights as Western or 
cultural imperialism) but appealing to a form of primordial justice – she knew what 
happened to her was wrong on her own terms and within her own culture. Moreover, 
Moghissi reiterates the previous point made in this piece that the main contemporary 
political opposition to Human Rights comes from authoritarian regimes and systems.  
What is also of interest, given our overview of the history of the ideas of Human Rights 
and cosmopolitan justice is to see how the very modern ideas of Moghissi are in line with 
one of the first scholars to reference natural law in the West, Grotius. He wrote: “[Natural 
law is] the dictate of right reason involving moral necessity, independent of any 
institution – human or divine.” (Grotius via Miller, 2011). When Moghissi says the 
warrant for intervention derives from their demands, not ours, she is arguing that the right 
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reason and moral necessity of each individual exists and justifies the protection of their 
fundamental Human Rights. 
  
Ms. Mai’s horrific treatment and subsequent dignified bravery provide us a visceral 
example of the importance of fundamental Human Rights as cosmopolitan justice. 
Debates surrounding cosmopolitan morality and Human Rights have real repercussions 
for billions around the world who do not have the good fortune to be born in societies 
which, de facto or de juris, provide them with the contexts for choice to exercise their 
Human Rights. In keeping with our historical overview of the progression of Human 
Rights, we can see Ms. Mai as simply part of a long global process in the emancipation of 
women, through the language of Human Rights sourced in cosmopolitan justice. Case in 
point, the words of suffrage campaigner Higginson from 1859 are as relevant to Ms. 
Mai’s case as they were to the Western women of the period: 
  
“I do not see how any woman can avoid a thrill of indignation when she first opens her 
eyes to the fact that it is really contempt, not reverence, that has so long kept her sex from 
an equal share of legal, political, and educational rights…[a woman needs equal rights] 
not because she is man’s better half, but because she is his other half. She needs them, 
not as an angel, but as a fraction of humanity.” (Higginson, 1859, p.304, via Kimmel & 
Mossmiller, 1992, p.111-14) 
  
Though women would not be granted the right to vote in the United States until the 20
th
 
century, the appeal of Higginson was, like Ms. Mai’s, against the patriarchal taqlîd of 
Western society at the time and his revindications predicated on an appeal to 
cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights. Higginson appeals to an indignation which is 
85 
 
sourced in the violation of inalienable rights on women’s own terms, precisely the same 
source noted by Moghissi in her words above and the spirit at the heart of Ms. Mai’s 
refusal to submit to the injustice of her circumstances. 
  
The Imperialism of Taqlîd 
  
Let us then take a moment to consider the most basic, dictionary definition of the term 
imperialism: “The extension or attempted extension of authority, influence, 
power, etc, by any person, country, institution, etc” (Collins World English Dictionary, 
2012). Let us further say that imperialism is more than just an extension of power, 
authority and influence but is characterized by the extension of arbitrary authority, 
meaning those born into the imperial system are inescapably subject to its commands. 
  
Considered thusly, and in light of our theoretical and practical examination of different 
form of imperialism, we can say that case of Ms. Mai is arguably an example of the 
imperialism of taqlîd, understood as the extension or attempted extension of authority, 
influence, power, etc., by any cultural or political group over those who happen to be 
born into it. In short, this paper advances that it is unjustifiable to condemn those 
accidentally born into a given cultural or political order to suffer its idiosyncracies 
without any limitations as provided by Human Rights. The imperialism of  taqlîd rejects 
the fundamental freedom to question, re-assess and re-evaluate one’s conception of the 
good life (Barry, 1995; Kymlicka 1989, p.52; Dworkin 1989, p.489; Macedo 1990, 
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p.247) including questioning the key assumptions of the societal order and conception of 
justice into which one is born. Ms. Mai, and all others who have suffered from this form 
of imperialism are those who most desperately need the cosmopolitan justice made 
manifest in fundamental Human Rights.  
  
When we consider the case of Ms. Mai, we can see that it is normatively and practically 
unacceptable to say that Muhktar Mai should simply have accepted the judge’s decision 
that it was appropriate for her to be gang-raped because that is considered just within the 
system of justice practiced by the tribes of the South Punjab into which she was born. 
This is unjustifiable and serves as clear example of the imperialism of taqlîd as being the 
unrestrained application of force by her society against her. Ms. Mai had to go beyond 
her immediate political and cultural environment (putting it, as we described earlier in a 
sandbox to limit its authority over her) and appealed to the formal Pakistani court system 
for the protection of her Human Rights which she enjoys by virtue of a cosmopolitan 
conception of justice which transcends cultural context. Ms.Mai’s ability to confront 
those who so brutally assaulted her was only possible because she could appeal to a 
conception of justice beyond that which was simply traditional or popular in her culture 
(taqlîd); she appealed to a conception of justice based on the innate and inviolate rights of 
all peoples, everywhere at all times, namely Human Rights as a manifestation of 
cosmopolitan justice. To drive the point home, this case is clearly not liberal, cultural or 
Western imperialism against Mukhtar Mai, rather her treatment was offensive on her own 
terms and was: 
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“… not so much ‘non-Western’… as anti-liberal, in conflict with the conception of 
individual autonomy and the protection of the individual from arbitrary coercion and 
violence…. Mukhtar was punished by the ‘community’ for what someone else allegedly 
did; not as an autonomous person, but as an organic part of her family” (Masso 2006, 
p.243) 
  
It is useful for our purposes to finish this section by reiterating that cosmopolitan justice 
and their manifestation via Human Rights are distinct from ‘the West’ (Benhabib 2002, 
26-28.). Rather, fundamental Human Rights opposed themselves everywhere to the 
imperialism of taqlîd by making all authority answerable to fundamental rights. The 
protection of fundamental Human Rights represent a manifestation of cosmopolitan 
justice by which any source of authority can be held to account – not only from without, 
but more importantly, as we have seen in the case of Ms. Mai, from within. 
 
PART VI: Conclusion 
 
In reviewing the diversity of information and argumentation advanced in this work, it is 
helpful to summarize how we went about it. To start, we clarified our terminology, 
paying particular attention to defining imperialism, Human Rights and cosmopolitan 
justice. We have focused on fundamental Human Rights (those rights which, when 
violated, constitute an egregious violation of justice) (Cranston, 1973). We have sourced 
those Human Rights in the fundamental right to rights (Arendt, 1986, p.436) and innate 
freedom and consequent necessity to demand respect (Kant, 1996, 6:237; Hoffe, 2006, 
p.121) in virtue of our pre-political humanity (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 30-35). We have 
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further posited that, in keeping with the arguments of Beitz and Pogge, the Rawlsian 
original position is applicable globally and provides an intuitive argument for showing 
that all persons could reasonably be expected to endorse fundamental Human Rights from 
behind the veil of ignorance. Moreover, the innovation of the veil of ignorance ensures 
that – to the degree possible- the taqlîd of contingent socialization and other arbitrary 
circumstances of birth would not discolor this conclusion; inasmuch, Human Rights can 
be said to be just in a cosmopolitan sense both in application and derivation. We lastly 
advanced the argument that cosmopolitan justice thus understood represents principles of 
justice which transcend time and place (Mandle, 2006; Pogge, 2005). 
 
We next turned to a brief overview of the evolution of the concepts of cosmopolitan 
justice and Human Rights through the (largely) Western canon. We paid particular 
attention to the explosive emergence of Human Rights into political dialogue following 
the American and French revolutions, with an additional uptick in Human Rights 
discourse following the Second World War. 
 
Having defined our key terms and presented the historical context for current debates in 
Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice, we turned to addressing two major criticisms 
advanced against the claim to cosmopolitan justice of Human Rights. 
 
The first criticism was that Human Rights represent a form of Western cultural 
imperialism. We focused on the particular criticism that Human Rights read like a 
89 
 
blueprint for liberal democracy and that this represents cultural imperialism underpinned 
by Western hegemony. We argued that Human Rights do in fact read like a blueprint for 
liberal democracy, but, far from being proof of cultural imperialism, the overwhelming 
global perception of the justness of democracy as a form of government (Dalton & Ngu-
Ngoc, 2005; Gallup, 2005; Heath, 2005; Ingelhart, 2003; Park & Shin, 2006; Tessler, 
2002), the global desire for fundamental Human Rights (CFR, 2012; Pew, 2003) and the 
association of the two as being related and mutually reinforcing (Pew, 2003; UN - 
UNHRC, 2012) strengthens our claims for the cosmopolitan justness of Human Rights.  
 
The second criticism was related but distinct, being that Human Rights represent a form 
of Western imperialism. We first disentangled Human Rights from being intrinsically 
Western in any sense other than their origin. We next engaged with an important and 
ongoing debate relating to Human Rights as Western Imperialism – that surrounding 
Asian values. Having historically situated the emergence of Asian values and enumerated 
those advanced, we were able to argue that those advanced lacked political impartiality 
and credibility. Moreover, we saw that the majority of Asian values were in fact 
questions of taqlîd and were not incompatible with fundamental Human Rights or 
cosmopolitan justice. We lastly took a cursory glance at several current BBC news stories 
to see that there is considerable dissonance between the rhetoric of Asian values and the 
desire of many Asians for Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice. 
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Having addressed criticisms of cultural and Western imperialism, we turned to further 
advancing our argument for the cosmopolitan justness of Human Rights. Exploring how 
Human Rights played important roles in the liberation of India and South Africa 
respectively, we provided further evidence of both the cosmopolitan nature and justness 
of Human Rights. 
 
We continued in this vein by examining the case of Mukhtar Mai through the lens of our 
preceding discussions of Human Rights as cosmopolitan justice. Captured by both her 
actions and the words of scholars, we saw how the case of Ms. Mai captures the innate 
and cosmopolitan justness of fundamental Human Rights. We were able to see that she 
claimed justice according to her own standards – not anyone else’s – and we were able to 
closely examine an example of an individual empowered through cosmopolitan justice. 
Building on her example, we offered our own definition of cultural imperialism (dubbing 
it the imperialism of taqlîd). We argued that this real cultural imperialism was the idea 
that the contingent circumstances of one’s birth (i.e., culture, gender, etc.,) could allow 
the exercising of power, unrestrained by fundamental rights, over anyone by virtue of 
nothing more than the lottery of birth.  
 
That summary brings us to our present point where we have an opportunity to reflect on 
what we have seen and what it means in a larger context (both practically and 
academically). 
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First and foremost, it is important to recognize that both the concepts of Human Rights 
and cosmopolitan justice can easily, and have been, seriously misused. Critics who 
advance arguments of Western and cultural imperialism against Human Rights and 
cosmopolitan justice do so not out of caprice, but informed by the brutal history of 
European colonialism (from the Spanish conquistadors to the late Victorian British 
Empire) which was predicated on its own perverse version of cosmopolitan justice and 
Human Rights. Both Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice are extremely powerful – 
perhaps the most powerful – normative endorsements of the modern age. This makes 
their misappropriation all the more likely and tempting as groups functioning under the 
aegis of Human Rights can justify otherwise unjustifiable actions (perhaps the most 
salient recent example was the American led invasion of Iraq).  
 
It is because of this powerful normative force that properly defining and understanding 
cosmopolitan justice is crucially important, both to prevent its conceptual misuse and to 
further the cause of fundamental Human Rights and cosmopolitan justice. Though it is 
difficult to advance general rules, from the definition we have seen here and all the cases 
we have examined, the best test for whether or not something is truly just in a 
cosmopolitan sense is if it acknowledges the implicit, unwavering and inviolate right to 
rights of all persons. Too many versions of so-called cosmopolitan justice (including 
many forms of exploitative and paternalistic colonialism) have justified removing the 
right to rights from persons whom it is seeking to render civilized enough to have rights. 
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This is opportunistic chauvinism and it is a phenomenon with a horrifying historical 
record; inasmuch, it is something against which we should always be on guard.  
 
Coming back to the beginning, are we now better equipped to reply to the question we set 
out to explore at the outset of this work: are fundamental Human Rights a manifestation 
of cosmopolitan justice? 
 
Arguably we are. Significant theoretical argumentation exists (as outlined in our 
summary above and in our definitions at the beginning of this work) which suggests that 
fundamental Human Rights represent a manifestation of cosmopolitan justice and are 
valid for all people and at all times. Tentative empirical evidence is emerging (CFE, 
2011; Pew, 2003) to confirm our intuitive understanding that the majority of people in the 
world want and endorse fundamental Human Rights (in addition, as our work has shown, 
to democracy). In an increasingly plural world this shared moral framework offers an 
excellent base for dialogue and for guaranteeing the security and freedom of all people. 
As more authoritarian countries rise to prominence (especially, but not only, China), as 
the Islamic world continues to contend with religious extremism and the complex 
transition to democracy and as the West loses its hegemonic power (and contends with 
ethnic and religious nativism of its own) this framework of fundamental Human Rights 
provides an invaluable standard and safeguard against totalitarian and essentializing 
systems.  
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In our overview of cosmopolitan justice and Human Rights we have looked at examples 
of its applicability and importance across the world, from South and East Asia, to South 
Africa, the Islamic world and the West. Discussions of cosmopolitan justice demand 
cosmopolitan examples and, as we have seen, the dynamic evolution of Human Rights is 
an ever more global phenomenon as both the local and worldwide implications of Human 
Rights as cosmopolitan justice are felt and addressed.  Despite this focus beyond the 
borders of the West, it is important to keep in mind that Human Rights and cosmopolitan 
justice remain central to ongoing debates in our societies and are by no means assured. In 
particular, the recent and troubling revelation of widespread data monitoring by the NSA 
in the United States and the GCHQ in the United Kingdom reminds us that questions of 
what constitutes a fundamental Human Rights, what constitutes an egregious violation of 
justice and whether all of humanity is in a shared moral community are just as pertinent 
and contentious in the West as elsewhere. 
 
Surely one of the most important discussions in Human Rights (both academically and 
practically) is and will continue to be the claims of various forms of Human Rights 
against one another (social, economic, cultural, etc.,). Establishing priority among these 
rights requires a meaningful cross-cultural dialogue (and is one where more local ideas, 
like Asian Values, can play a more legitimate role). Nevertheless, we must be careful to 
ensure that disagreements about these ideal Human Rights do not in any way endanger 
the expansion, adoption and adamantine defence of the fundamental Human Rights we 
have advanced herein (as they almost were at the 1993 Human Rights Conference in 
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Vienna). Such fundamental Human Rights represent a cosmopolitan form of justice 
whereby basic human dignity and security is protected and sources of authority and 
power are curtailed and held to fundamental account. No mandate, be it democratic, 
theistic, authoritarian or otherwise, trumps our collective and individual claims to these 
fundamental and pre-political Human Rights which are held in virtue of our humanity 
alone. These fundamental Human Rights do not guarantee the best but they are 
irreplaceable both in protecting the most vulnerable amongst us and preventing the worst. 
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